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Intra-Household Labor Allocation in Colonial Nigeria 
 
Abstract. We use a year-long panel of time-use data from colonial Nigeria to show that labor 
complementarities and strategic concerns shaped the time-use decisions of African 
households. Using quantitative and ethnographic approaches, we show that health shocks 
imposed time costs that followed the gender division of labor. The labor of others did not 
automatically compensate for this. Whether individuals could respond by recruiting 
substitutes depended on social standing, urgency of work, and type of illness. Labor was 
coordinated between spouses. Child labor was coordinated with parental work, aided 
childcare, and allowed children to build skills and resources. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many important economic choices concerning resource allocation, production, and 
labor supply are made within households. Understanding how households arrive at these 
decisions is essential for understanding the behavioral and distributional consequences of 
economic policies (Alderman et al., 1995; Mazzocco, 2007), for correctly estimating 
levels of social inequality (Lise and Seitz, 2011), and for understanding whether 
households can achieve efficient allocations (Bobonis, 2009; Rangel and Thomas, 2005). 
From these motivations, a large literature has emerged that tests between alternative 
models of the household, and that estimates the technologies of home production, 
consumption, and labor supply.
1
 In this paper, we contribute to this literature by using a 
unique data source to examine the roles of labor complementarities and strategic concerns 
in household time allocation in an example from African history.  
From 1939 to 1940, the anthropologist Jack Harris visited the Igbo village of 
Amankwu, in colonial Nigeria. He collected information on the daily activities of a 
sample of villagers over the course of a year. We use these reports to create panel data on 
time use covering more than 6,000 person-days. The reports also provide a rich body of 
descriptive evidence on individuals’ motivations. We use these data to test the degree to 
which labor complementarities and strategic concerns shaped time use decisions.  
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 See Browning et al. (2014) for a review. 
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In particular, we test whether labor between spouses is complementary and whether 
similar complementarities exist between parents and children. We use two broad classes 
of test for complementarity. First, we investigate responses to illness. If labor is 
substitutable, the healthy spouse or child of an individual facing a health shock should 
intensify productive activities to make up the work of the sick individual and to maintain 
household output. We find little evidence of this in the data, with the exception that 
men’s harvesting work increases when their wives are sick. This failure of substitution 
may be driven by several considerations, including caring labor, the urgency of other 
individuals’ work, lack of urgency of the work lost, or by labor complementarities, i.e. by 
whether an increase in labor input by one individual raises the marginal product of labor 
for another individual. We support complementarities as an important part of the 
explanation using our second broad class of test. We demonstrate that both spouses and 
parent-child pairs coordinate their activities over and above what would be predicted by 
the agricultural cycle. In the case of spouses, complementarities arise in part from task 
specialization within a gender division of labor that households mostly take as given. 
This is consistent with anthropological descriptions of Igbo agriculture, in which work 
such as farm clearing, planting, and palm production were cooperative activities in which 
the actions of one individual facilitated the tasks of others. For children, this is explained 
both by the complementarity of child labor with adult labor and by the ease with which 
child care is combined with child labor. The candid narratives in our data add further 
context. 
 Second, we test for strategic misallocation in time use. By “strategic misallocation,” 
we mean the allocation of resources such as time or income to uses that have lower 
returns, but that increase an individual’s claim to the resource or its returns. Here, our 
evidence is primarily ethnographic. On the question of strategic concerns in time 
allocation, there is no quantitative evidence that individuals strategically reallocate their 
time to take advantage of a spouse’s absence. The descriptive evidence, by contrast, 
provides multiple examples of strategic time use that may divert time from more 
productive allocations: for instance, men cultivate women’s crops in order to preserve 
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their bargaining power. Because visible contributions to production create claims over 
consumption, tasks are wastefully duplicated. Husbands attempt to limit the income-
generating activities of their wives as punishment for misbehavior, but are constrained by 
their wives’ social networks and outside options, as well as by the threat of non-
cooperation and retaliation within marriage. Responses to illness reveal a similar pattern. 
The ability to recruit substitute labor depends on an individual’s relationships and status 
within the household. Senior (earlier-married) wives, in particular, are better able to 
recruit substitutes. The chronically ill, excepting those “too old to work,” face greater 
difficulty replacing their lost time. Individuals in the data view child labor as a way for 
parents to look after children while accomplishing their work, for children to build human 
capital and earn small discretionary incomes, and for adopted wards to earn their keep. In 
many cases, then, children use their labor as a source of autonomy. This strategic 
behavior is understandable if individuals’ bargaining power over the allocation of 
resources depends on both exogenous characteristics and endogenous choices. Markers of 
bargaining power in our data include age, social status, health, social networks, and crop-
specific labor inputs.  
 
2. Historical background  
 
During the colonial period in Nigeria, the Igbo lived mostly in rural communities with 
populations ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand (Gailey, 1970: p. 23). They 
practiced bush-fallow agriculture in which land was cultivated for a period of years 
before being left fallow to return to bush. Tasks were highly seasonal, with land clearing 
and preparation concentrated between January and March, planting during March and 
April, and harvests collected in October and November (Forde, 1937; Martin, 1988). For 
men, farming was centered on the cultivation of yams, while women planted several 
crops, including maize, cassava, and cocoyams (Harris, 1940, 1943, 1944). These crops 
were then owned separately by the husband and wife (Green, 1964; Harris, 1940). 
Women were responsible for feeding the household, although husbands would help, 
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particularly from September through November (Green, 1964; Harris, 1940). Women’s 
control over food was cited by anthropologists at the time as a source of influence over 
men (Forde, 1950; Green, 1964; Harris, 1940). 
The principal commercial products were palm oil and palm kernels (Harris, 1942). 
These were processed from the fruits of wild palm trees, and were harvested year-round, 
though the greatest yields were achieved between January and May (Martin, 1988). 
During the rainy season lasting from roughly April to October, when there was a lull in 
farm tasks, extraction of palm kernels was women’s principal work (Uchendu, 1965). 
Igbo society was patrilocal; a son remained in his father’s compound after his own 
marriage. The Igbo practiced polygamy, and marriage involved the payment of bride 
price (Basden, 1921, p. 98). Each of a man’s wives would have a separate hut within the 
compound, forming a matrifocal unit with her children and dependents (Uchendu, 1965, 
p. 188). 
The gender division of labor in agriculture varied by place, but typically men were 
responsible for clearing, planting, training, harvesting, and storing yams. Women would 
plant their own crops, weed farms, and carry in the harvest (Forde, 1950; Harris, 1943). 
Clearing labor was typically performed by cooperative groups of men who would help 
each other in turn (Green, 1964). Children helped with farming from an early age, and 
fathers often gave boys yams to plant for themselves (Green, 1964). Men cut palm fruit, 
tapped and sold palm wine, and sold palm oil prepared by women. Women, in turn, 
reserved the palm kernels for themselves (Forde, 1950). While men made climbing ropes, 
mats, baskets, spoons, chairs, and bed-frames for sale (Green, 1964), the production and 
sale of pottery was overwhelmingly a female task (Forde, 1950). Petty trade was largely a 
woman’s domain, while longer-distance trade was a male pursuit (Green, 1964). Unlike 
Yoruba women, Green noted that Igbo women would leave their children at home while 
at market, often in their husbands’ care (Green, 1964).  
Despite these divisions, there were complementarities between men’s and women’s 
tasks. It is not our aim to establish the origins of the gender division of labor. While some 
tasks may be naturally suited to the comparative advantages of one gender, the division 
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between men’s and women’s crops is not constant across West Africa (see, for example, 
Hoddinot and Haddad (1995, p. 83)). Taking divisions of labor as given, there are several 
reasons why complementarities might exist. In clearing work, these stemmed from the 
urgency of performing a large amount of labor over a short time period (Henderson, 
1972, p. 163). In planting and weeding, task complementarity was in part due to the 
technology of intercropping. Among the southern Igbo, men would make holes for 
planting that women and children would then fill with topsoil and yam seedlings 
(Uchendu, 1965). Women would also plant their crops on or in between the slopes of the 
mounds created for yams, and while women planted their crops, men staked the growing 
yams (Uchendu, 1965). Labor in palm production similarly created complementarities in 
which tasks performed by women followed in succession from men’s tasks (e.g. Basden 
(1921, p. 160)), in a process that was described as “cooperative” (Green, 1964). 
The data we use are based on the field notes of Jack Harris, who produced five 
publications on the basis of these, listed in the bibliography. Because Harris’ academic 
career was cut short by the Second World War, we are able to use his field notes to draw 
several novel conclusions. For instance, we use the daily activities for statistical and 
specific anecdotal data, which Harris did not. Neither did his papers, as our study does, 
examine the response of time allocation to shocks, day-to-day changes in tasks, or the 
causes of child work. Indeed, two of his papers focus on issues not relevant here: 
historical slavery and a breakdown of cash incomes and expenditures for sixteen 
individuals. A further two are primarily descriptive summaries outlining the basic farm 
practices of the Igbo and the division of labor by age and gender. These works feature 
little analysis or discussion of intra-household bargaining or the coordination of labor. 
The most relevant of Harris’ papers to our analysis is his "The position of women in a 
Nigerian society." This is an eight-page study that provides only a brief and general 
overview of bargaining between spouses.
2
 Our analysis differs from Harris’ in both aims 
                                                        
2
 The structure of his paper is as follows: Harris argues that, though the Igbo lack formal political 
organization, effective mechanisms for the expression of women's importance exist. He describes the 
community and its sub-divisions, noting that women have separate, parallel courts and councils.  He 
briefly describes what these do. He then notes that women stress their importance as food producers and 
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and methods, and represents a novel contribution to the study of households in colonial 
Nigeria. Nevertheless, where we build on Harris’ analysis or reach the same conclusions, 
we cite his work in the text.  
 
3. Conceptual framework 
 
In order to understand the behaviors we observe, we draw on several recent insights 
from family economics. Our paper is, first, a contribution to the literature on labor 
complementarity within the household. We use two strategies to look for 
complementarities. First, we use illness of others in the household. Because illness 
imposes time costs on individuals, we can follow the approach of Adhvaryu and 
Nyshadham (2014), who argue that, if labor within the household were substitutable, the 
labor inputs of others in the household would rise to compensate. Since we find only 
limited evidence of substitution, illness has a larger adverse effect on the household’s 
productive capacity than if labor were less complementary. Second, we find clear 
evidence that individuals within the same household coordinate their activities over and 
above what would be predicted by the annual agricultural cycle. In particular, we 
examine the degree of complementarity between spouses and between parents and 
children. Present-day studies find evidence of considerable labor complementarity, both 
within agricultural households as in Adhvaryu and Nyshadam (2014), and across gender 
lines more generally as a result of the gender division of labor in adults (De Giorgi, et al., 
                                                                                                                                                                     
child bearers when advocating their own interests -- a point we reiterate below.  He describes the 
different times of the year during which men and women are responsible for feeding the household, and 
notes that women and men can withhold food during these periods as a bargaining tactic. Men are at a 
disadvantage, because other food is available during their period of responsibility. He notes that 
retaliatory measures are limited by fear of divorce. Harris notes that women invoke female ancestors 
when performing ceremonies and oaths. Women use proxies in land deals, which helps them evade a  
husband's influence. He notes that women bring no possessions into marriage but can claim some assets 
on divorce. He then gives five examples of women's power: a dispute in which men attempted to force 
women to cease their adultery but were frustrated when the women left the men responsible for child 
care; an instance when women refused to cook until the men met their obligations to repair a bridge and 
clean a path; women boycotting another woman who had refused to pay a fine; the technique of sitting 
outside a man's house and singing songs of ridicule until he relents; and the Aba Riots of 1929. 
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2014). Similar work in economic history has tested the degree to which the labor inputs 
of individuals respond to the unemployment and wages of their spouses (Bean, 2015; 
Moehling, 2001). 
Our households’ choices are better understood if spousal labor is complementary in 
production, and if child labor is complementary with adult labor. This type of 
supermodularity can result from task specialization created by the gender division of 
labor, as described above. Various approaches have modeled this division as the result of 
a Nash bargaining process or as given by social norms (Browning, Chiappori and 
Lechene, 2009; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). The broad assignment of crops to specific 
genders and the implicit responsibilities for the provision of specific public goods within 
the households that we observe are consistent with observations from other parts of West 
Africa (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Udry, 1996). Households in our data largely take these as 
externally determined.  
Second, our paper adds to the literature that tests between alternative models of the 
household. Much of this literature has focused on comparisons of “unitary” models that 
treat the household as if consumption and labor supply are decided by the maximization 
of the rational preferences of a single actor, and “collective” models that assume only that 
intra-household bargaining results in an outcome that is Pareto efficient. The preference 
for the collective model over the unitary model is near universal in the literature. In 
general, tests have focused on rejection of two testable implications of the unitary model: 
Slutsky symmetry and the irrelevance of exogenous “distribution factors,” such as 
divorce laws, that affect decisions without directly affecting preferences or the budget 
constraint (Browning et al., 2014).  
Several theoretical and empirical results have shown that increases in an individual’s 
bargaining power generally increase that individual’s leisure and shift consumption in 
that individual’s favor (Blundell et al., 2005; Chiappori et al., 2002; Duflo, 2003). By 
contrast, tests of the collective model based on quasi-Slutsky conditions and the 
proportional impacts of distribution factors have generally failed to reject the model 
(Browning et al., 2014). An economic history literature on child labor has made similar 
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observations, noting that child labor often depends on the relative incomes of others in 
the household (e.g. Humphries, 2013). In our data, the importance of distribution factors 
favors collective over unitary models, and is visible in the control exercised by senior 
wives and the more able-bodied over the labor of others, and in the importance of social 
networks and individuals’ outside options in shaping outcomes within the household.  
Third, our paper is a contribution to the literature that tests for strategic misallocation 
by poor households. Existing literature shows that poor households often allocate 
resources towards unproductive activities for strategic reasons. These include defending 
property (Field, 2007; Goldstein and Udry, 2008), hiding income (Anderson and Baland, 
2002; Jakiela and Ozier, 2015), free-riding on others’ efforts (Alger and Weibull, 2010), 
and concealing assets (Ashraf, 2009). These incentives are particularly strong in West 
African households like those in our data, where income pooling is incomplete (Duflo 
and Udry, 2004).  
The model presented by Basu (2006) is particularly useful for understanding strategic 
misallocation within our data. He extends the collective model so that Pareto weights also 
depend on current and past choices. For example, a woman’s decision to work both 
depends on her influence on household decisions and contributes to her influence on 
household decisions. By working, she may increase her bargaining power, and so the 
intra-household sharing rule may depend on household choices. Basu uses this extension 
to show that multiple equilibria may exist for female labor supply, and that child labor 
may be a non-linear function of maternal bargaining power.   
A feature of endogenous bargaining power that is not present in standard collective 
models is that households may achieve inefficient outcomes; household members over-
engage in activities that improve their weight in the household decision process. These 
resemble the patterns Udry (1996) describes in Burkina Faso. There, individuals have 
control of specific plots of land and care more about output on their own plots than 
maximizing total output. Imperfect information about the contribution of one member to 
another’s activities is a common source of conflict. In our data, the most visible aspect of 
endogenous bargaining power is that contribution to the cultivation of specific crops 
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establishes claims over their consumption. In the Ivory Coast, Duflo and Udry (2004) 
show how a similar system of “separate accounts” leads to a failure of full insurance. In 
our data, endogenous bargaining power helps us account for wasteful duplication of 
tasks, men punishing their wives by preventing them from going to market, and senior 
wives’ control over the labor of junior (later-married) wives in polygamous households. 
 
4. Data and analysis 
Data 
The data we use consists of the daily activities of the members of five male-headed 
Igbo households in the village of Amankwu, and were collected between February 1939 
and February 1940. These field notes have been deposited in the Melville J. Herskovits 
library at Northwestern University. Each day, one person reports what the members of 
these households did during that day. Usually, it is the senior man Ezeala who makes 
these reports. These descriptions are richly detailed, and are frequently interrupted by 
explanations of why individuals engaged in these activities. We use these testimonies as 
sources of both quantitative and ethnographic data. A sample record for one day 
(Monday, 10 July, 1939) is presented in Appendix B. Consistent with the larger set of 
daily reports, this sample provides details as rich and varied as the timing and intensity of 
the rain, the content of meals, the specifics of mandatory community (“age-grade”) labor, 
the cost and procedure for ritually avenging theft, and the locations of farms and the 
specific tasks taking place on each one. Thus, these data offer a window not just into time 
use and labor allocation, but also into life in colonial Amankwu. 
Each household in the data consists of a core group of adults and biological children, 
as well as wards and boarders related to the core family. We follow Harris’ definitions of 
relationships between household members. Relatives and friends visit sporadically, often 
contributing their time to the household during their stay. While the households in our 
data are distantly related, they generally stand alone in terms of labor and resources 
shared.  Although the sample contains time use details on over 60 distinct individuals, 
there are 37 key household members who appear consistently. Details on these 
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individuals are given in Appendix A, alongside the number of appearances of each 
individual in the regression sample. We present a chart of the relationships between the 
individuals in the regression sample in Table 1. The households are named for the men 
who head them – Ezeala, Cikia, Mba, Uda, and Egwuonwu. 
 
Analysis 
We use both quantitative and ethnographic approaches to analyze the data. For our 
quantitative analyses, we keep the 24 individuals who appear at least once every three 
days in the record. Across the 328 days during which reports are made for these 
individuals, we construct dummy variables for whether, on a given day, these individuals 
engaged in each of a set of activities, such as farming, producing palm oil, caring for 
children, or being sick.  
Summary statistics for these activities are given in Table 2. We acknowledge that 
activities in our sample are measured with error; for example, the fraction of days in 
which individuals engage in child care is low. Similarly, individuals do not report eating 
every day. Rather than focusing on unconditional means, then, we center our attention on 
correlations within the data, knowing these may be subject to downward attenuation bias.  
Despite this concern, the summary statistics contain useful information that can be 
cross-validated against what is known about the frequency of important economic 
activities and about the division of labor within the household. Individuals in our sample 
are sick roughly one day in twenty, and are reported farming on roughly a third of days. 
A small fraction of this is clearing labor. The bulk is in planting and harvesting. Though 
these numbers may appear low, they are consistent with other evidence from West 
Africa. Forde and Scott (1946, p. 94), for example, suggest that 92 man-days are needed 
to clear a one acre cocoa farm in Western Nigeria, followed by maintenance over four 
years of non-production requiring 180 man-days total, and 114 man-days needed per year 
while the farm is in production. Akinbode et al (2011), similarly, suggest that 164 days of 
family labor per year was typical for rice-farming households in a 2009 sample from 
Niger State. Stone et al (1990) found 1,599 hours per year was the average per adult 
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worker on all phases of field and crop processing in a 1985 sample from central Nigeria. 
Cleave (1974), lastly, summarized a wide set of studies and concluded that adult 
members of African farm families worked in the fields 120-160 days in the year.  
Fafchamps (1993) finds that the average days per hectare of household labor per year 
across 6 Burkina Faso villages surveyed in 1981-83 ranged from 50 to 109. He explains 
the low level of labor inputs in his Burkina Faso sample by noting first that the marginal 
productivity of labor is low and that labor expended preparing large farms may simply 
lead to labor bottlenecks later in the season, in an environment with incomplete labor 
markets. This is not an uncommon finding. Guyer (1980), describing data from the 1950s 
and 1960s, found that men do 66 days of work on cocoa farms and 106 on food farms 
among the Yoruba, compared to 77 and 33 days among the Beti, while women do 7 and 
10 days among the Yoruba and 9 and 174 days among the Beti. Lagemann (1977), 
similarly, found 203 man-hours per man equivalent per year to be the norm for for farm 
work in Eastern Nigeria (excluding, however work by women and children). Oladeebo 
and Okanlawon (2013) suggested that 81 man-days per year was typical for yam 
cultivation in Oyo state.  
Households in our sample report making palm produce roughly one day in twenty. 
This too is consistent with other observations on Igbo farming and palm production. 
Forde and Scott (1946) describe Umor in the palm belt. There, clearing labor involved 
parties of 12 to 30 men (p.47). A man clearing a 3 acre farm would need 4 or more of 
these parties (p.47). Farms would be weeded 2 or 3 times between May and September 
(p. 47). A 36 lb tin of palm oil took 3 to 5 days of labor, 2 to 3 of which would be 
provided by women (p. 51). Archival evidence (National Archives of Nigeria, Enugu, 
File Abadist 9/1/1362), similarly suggests that harvesting occurred roughly every twenty-
four days. 
There is a clear gender division of labor in the summary statistics that is reflected in 
both anthropological accounts and the ethnographic data. Clearing labor skews male, 
child care is a predominantly female task, planting and harvesting are disproportionately 
female, and mat-making is a mostly male activity. 
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We test whether time allocation for adults and children responds to health shocks or 
to the time allocation decisions of other household members. Our generic regression 
specification is a linear probability model: 
yit = βxit + δi + ηt + δi × t + εit     (1) 
Here, yit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i experienced a particular 
outcome on day t. For example, this may be an indicator for having farmed, or for having 
been sick. xit is an indicator for an event affecting individual i on the same day. Examples 
include whether individual i was ill, whether at least one of i's wives was ill, or whether 
at least one of i's parents performed farm work. These allow us to identify responses to 
illness shocks and to describe the coordination of time within households. For example, 
we ask whether person i is more likely to engage in farm labor on days a spouse is 
harvesting palm oil, or whether illness affects an individual’s own time allocation 
decisions.  
δi is an individual fixed effect. This term captures the greater propensity of some 
individuals to engage in certain activities throughout the year, and absorbs any time-
invariant individual heterogeneity. For example, if a man engages in farm labor less than 
other men, and has a wife who is sick unusually often, the δi will purge any spurious 
correlation arising from these two facts. Similarly, ηt are fixed effects for each day t. 
These will remove unobserved heterogeneity due to the cycle of work over the year. δi × t 
is a set of individual-specific linear time trends, accounting for possible omitted trending 
variables. εit is random error. We estimate (1) using ordinary least squares. To account for 
serial correlation in the residuals, we cluster standard errors by individual.  
Ethnographic evidence is also central to our analysis. In particular, narratives provide 
detail that can be used to more completely explain household time use decisions. 
Furthermore, we use this evidence to clarify trends and relationships identified in the 
regressions, and to contextualize the behavior of the individuals in the sample. Anecdotal 
data sheds light on the motivation behind certain decisions, often explaining the “custom” 
or circumstances prompting a given action.  
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5. Complementarity 
In this section, we test for labor complementarities by examining responses to illness 
and coordination of tasks over and above what would be predicted by the agricultural 
calendar. We supplement these tests with evidence from the ethnographic record. In 
Table 3, we categorize activities as generally complementary or substitutable based both 
on our reading of the anthropological literature and on the general patterns observed in 
the quantitative and ethnographic results. 
 
Illness and time costs 
We begin by demonstrating the salience of illness. In Table 4, we find that health 
shocks are meaningful in that they clearly impose time costs on affected individuals. 
Several types of labor are reduced in response to adverse health shocks—these include 
farming, gathering, and palm production. Further, the effects of these shocks differ 
according to the gender division of labor. Women reduce their market activity, while men 
are less likely to make mats. Men and women who are ill spend more time resting.  
The ethnographic evidence suggests that, more often than not, individuals respond to 
their own illness by resting and postponing their work. For example, although he talks 
with Jack Harris that day, Ezeala feels too tired to farm and so decides not to work 
(20/4/39). In cases where work is pressing or can no longer be postponed, individuals 
continue to work despite illness. Ezeala, for example, works through his sickness when 
his tasks are both time-bound and prestigious. Despite a sore in his eye, he fulfils his 
community obligations by making funeral arrangements for a Ndiagbo woman (26/8/39). 
In another instance, he hires a farm worker to make up for the lost labor of a sick helper 
(23/2/39). The difference between this case and other instances when he does not work 
when ill was likely determined by the agricultural season; the time-bound act of farm 
clearing typically peaked in late February, since planting began in March. After a long 
period of rest due to sickness from an injection to treat leprosy, Nwayem can no longer 
wait to collect food, and so goes to harvest cassava even while still sick (10/2/40). 
Ofruice, too, does what she can when she injures her leg badly. While she normally 
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assists at the farm, during her convalescence, she instead watches her mother Ekodu’s 
baby at home (14/9/39, 20/9/39, 23/9/39).
3
  
Sick individuals may also find difficulty in seeking care while ill. Although healthy 
household members do sometimes tend the sick by making remedies (Amabua 29/12/39), 
administering purges (Ezeala 14/5/39), and bathing them (Egwuonwu 7/8/39-31/8/39), 
treatment itself is often self-administered. For instance, Akaji is forced to gather leaves to 
bathe her eyes in treatment of a headache (15/8/39). In Onwamini’s case, sickness 
involves the burden of cooking himself food suitable to his tender stomach, even though 
Afoca and Alozia are available at that time (29/5/39). This supports our interpretation 
below that where the labor supply of healthy household members does not increase in 
response to another’s illness, this is mostly due to labor complementarity, rather than due 
to care for the sick. 
 
Illness and complementarity 
Next, we test how one individual’s illness affects the time use decisions of others in 
the household. If labor is complementary rather than substitutable, illness shocks should 
not increase other household members’ propensity to work, particularly in activities 
making up work for the sick individual. In Figures 1A through 1C, we plot conditional 
means for adult men and women for three important activities – farming, going to market, 
and palm production. For farming, a slight increase in work conditional on spousal illness 
is visible for men, but not for women. For market work, there is a visible decline for men 
                                                        
3
 To test for differences by farming season, we have produced additional quantitative results that we do not 
report. These results are available on request. We have estimated our main results from Tables 3 
through 5 separately for the six months in which individuals report farming most frequently and the six 
months in which they report it the least frequently. We refer to these as the “high farming” and “low 
farming” seasons. Results are broadly similar across periods, but some differences are worth noting. 
Responses of non-farming tasks to own illness are more pronounced in the low-farming season. Women 
only reduce farming and palm production in response to a husband’s illness in the low-farming season. 
Men significantly reduce farming and palm production in response to same-gender illness in the low-
farming season. Coordination with parental work exists in both seasons. For women, going to market 
increases in response to spousal absence in the high-farming season. Women coordinate with their 
husbands on palm production in both seasons. These results accord with our main findings that work 
tends only to be replaced when it is time bound or otherwise prioritized. 
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conditional on spousal illness, and a visible increase for women. For palm production, 
there is a visible decline in men’s work conditional on spousal illness, and an increase for 
women. These figures, then, present a mixed pattern consistent with both substitution and 
complementarity. 
Because these patterns in conditional means may be contaminated by individual 
heterogeneity and seasonality, regression estimates of (1) are presented in Table 4. We 
find few significant effects. For women, effects are largely negative, albeit insignificant. 
Women are less likely to engage in certain farming activities when their husbands are 
sick. There are a few positive effects for husbands. Men are more likely to engage in 
harvesting while their wives are sick, leading to an overall increase in farm work. This 
does not preclude complementarity in other tasks that, as we indicate above, 
anthropologists described as cooperative or in which the tasks performed by one 
individual made the tasks performed by another easier. For palm production, the effect of 
a wife’s illness is negative, though insignificant. Complementary between the labor of 
spouses is one explanation of this pattern, though caring labor, the urgency of other 
individuals’ work, and lack of urgency of the work lost exist as additional possibilities. 
Similarly, efforts by other individuals to continue working at tasks that increase their own 
bargaining power can explain both failure to substitute for an ill relative and why the 
reduction in own tasks is often insignificant. Results using the illness shocks of all other-
gendered adults within the household are similar (not reported). The loss of male labor in 
these tasks makes female labor less productive.  
Expanding analysis to illness shocks affecting other adults in the household, there is 
only limited evidence of substitution in same-gendered labor. Results are reported in 
Table 4. Many responses are statistically insignificant. Men are less likely to harvest, rest, 
or report being sick if another adult male is sick, though only the first is significant. 
Women are less likely to rest or report being sick when another adult woman in the 
household is ill, though again only the first is significant. We report estimates of men’s 
responses to child illness in Table 4. 
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These patterns are also visible in the ethnographic record. Ezeala, in one example, 
chooses not to farm due to a cold, but does not seek replacement labor. Furthermore, his 
relative Afoca and wife Alozia do not divert their activities to help him, and instead 
continue farming their own crops (15/5/39). 
 
Complementarity and coordination between spouses 
In addition to the absence of labor substitution in the face of household illness, we 
provide further, positive, evidence that complementarities in cross-gender production 
exist, and so can help explain the lack of labor substitution in response to illness. To this 
end, we show in Table 6 that there is evidence of substantial coordination of spousal 
time. Couples engage in the same activities on the same day, especially when engaged in 
several types of farm work, mat production, and palm production. A similar pattern is 
apparent in Figure 2B, in which we plot conditional means for farm work, conditional on 
spousal activity. Two exceptions are childcare, a strongly gendered activity, and going to 
market, since spouses tend not to sell goods on the same day. Together, these patterns are 
congruent with the descriptions provided above by anthropologists, who describe work 
such as farm clearing, planting, and palm production as cooperative activities or as 
activities in which one individual’s efforts aided those of others. Notably, the degree of 
coordination and thus of labor complementarity is likely underestimated here, due to the 
fact that in larger and more complex activities such as palm production, gendered 
complementarities exist both across tasks as well as in tasks that occur over the course of 
several days or weeks, rather than simultaneously. 
 
Illness and complementarity in child labor 
We treat individuals aged 16 or below in the data as “children.”4 We begin by asking 
whether child labor substitutes for adult labor when a child’s parents are sick. Conditional 
means indicate a clear drop in the probability a child farms if a parent is sick, from 
roughly 23% to 5%. As these figures may be contaminated by individual heterogeneity 
                                                        
4
 The oldest individuals under this cut-off have ages estimated by Harris to be between 12 and 14. 
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and seasonality, we estimate (1) on the sample of children, using parental illness as the 
right-hand-side variable of interest. There are not enough children in the data to estimate 
these regressions separately for boys and girls. In Table 5, we find little evidence that 
children replace their parents when they are ill. Children are more likely to rest and less 
likely to care for other children on days when at least one parent is sick, though neither 
pattern is significant. They are less likely to go to market. This finding again suggests 
that labor within the household is complementary, rather than substitutable.  
Ethnographic evidence reveals a similar pattern. In many cases, children are reported 
as pursuing their own activities when their mothers are ill, such as hunting or buying 
items for themselves (Ikoka & Akoma 11/30/39 & 20/1/40), or as farming on behalf of 
individuals other than their mothers (Akaji & Mbanta 18/9/39). This failure to make up 
parental labor occurs despite the fact that these same children are capable of working, and 
can be found assisting heads of household during the course of everyday work—in the 
case of Mbanta, even helping his uncle Uda farm on the same day as his sick mother’s 
work goes uncompleted (18/9/39).  
We find that child labor does not substitute for the labor of a sick parent, except 
perhaps under extraordinary circumstances. In our data, there is one clear instance in 
which child labor exists as a strategy for coping with parental illness and infirmity, and it 
arises as a long-term rather than a short-term response to permanent adult disability. 
Mmeziri, the intended wife of Iheukwumere, is brought to live with Iheukwumere’s 
father Egwuonwu before puberty, earlier than is typical for a new bride, because 
Egwuonwu is too old to work much. His wife has recently died, his daughter Nwangras 
has recently gone into the fatting house (a period of seclusion before marriage), and his 
son Iheukwumere is frequently away, leaving no one to cook and work for the household 
(Introductory/family tree section – File C; 5/7/39).  Mmeziri is described as working 
“harder than anyone else in Ndi Akwu,” (Introductory section – File C), and the data 
bears this statement out. Although the data do not allow us to evaluate how perfectly 
Mmeziri’s labor substitutes for that of an adult male’s labor (e.g. by observing farm 
output and her labor productivity), at the age of 8-10, Mmeziri “actually does all the work 
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for the family of Egwuonwu” (5/7/39), and shoulders considerably more responsibility 
than Harris (1943) suggests would be appropriate for her age and sex. Performing even 
strength-intensive household and farming tasks on her own sets her apart from the 
children of similar age in the data, such as Akoma, Omenyenya, and Ofruice, who rarely 
spearhead their household’s work. Later, even when Nwangras emerges from the fatting 
house and Iheukwumere returns from his travels, Mmeziri is described as leading the 
work while the other two assist (Nwangras 30/9/39, 4/2/40). The ethnographic account 
makes it clear that Mmeziri’s systematic substitution for Egwuonwu’s labor is 
exceptional rather than typical, and that it is driven by Egwuonwu’s chronic debility 
rather than by occasional illness. 
 
 
Complementarity and coordination between parents and children 
As between spouses, parents in the data do appear to coordinate their labor with that 
of their children: they tend to engage in the same tasks on the same days. This is 
especially the case in farming, where conditional means show that children have a 33% 
chance of farming on days their parents also farm, a probability which drops to roughly 
13% on days their parents do not farm. As these figures may be contaminated by 
individual heterogeneity and seasonality, In Table 5, we show regression results. Children 
are more likely to engage in farming or palm production on the days their parents also 
perform these tasks. In addition to the complementarity between adult and child labor, 
children are easier to supervise if they are brought along while their parents work; light 
child work in farming and palm production is thus a form of disguised childcare. The 
need for supervision of child work also explains why we do not see them replace the 
labor of a sick parent.  
The ethnographic evidence, too, shows that children tend to be present on farms the 
same days their parents work in farming, although the motivation for this parent-child 
coordination differs by child age.  
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Although infants and toddlers are brought to the farm, the coordination of their time 
with that of their parents is largely driven by childcare demands rather than labor 
complementarity. Respondents’ testimonies suggest that the tasks in which children 
engaged were not just a proactive matter of child supervision, but in many cases, a 
necessity prompted by a lack of other suitable childcare options. The entry for Mba’s and 
Ahudiya’s yam planting on 18/3/39 states that “Uce and Mary went alone, to sleep and 
cry. They do not work but the parents like to have them there so that they can keep their 
eye on them.” Once they were at the farm, however, it was thought that even the 
youngest children might as well work. For example, although it is stated on 18/3/39 that 
Uce and Mary are only really brought to the farm for supervisory purposes, three days 
later, it is stated that they accompanied Mba, and while at the farm, helped him “to put 
yams in the heaps” (21/3/39).  
For older children, the quantitative results that suggest parent-child labor coordination 
are supported by ethnographic evidence that these children do not just coordinate their 
labor with that of their parents, but that they also quite explicitly engage in 
complementary tasks. This is especially evident in agricultural labor, where child labor 
appears most frequently. Older children brought to the farm typically help in whatever 
way they can. This is most often the case in low-strength or auxiliary tasks (Harris, 
1943), such as gathering stakes, tending yam tendrils, placing cuttings in dug heaps, or 
carrying the harvest home (Omenyenya 18/12/39, Akoma 11/7/39, Onwamini 30/8/39 & 
8/3/39). Thus, children regularly engage in work that is not only suitable to their limited 
abilities, but which also frees up parental labor for more strength-intensive or technical 
tasks. 
 
6. Strategic misallocation 
 
Household form and bargaining concerns can also cause households to allocate time 
less productively than they might otherwise, for instance, incentivizing individuals to 
bolster their personal position within the household rather than to maximize the 
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household’s income. We test for strategic behavior by turning to the ethnographic record. 
Such strategic behavior is evident in male cultivation of female crops, husbands’ attempts 
to limit activities by wives that might generate bargaining power, and in the importance 
of social status in shaping responses to illness. We supplement these tests with further 
ethnographic evidence on the work of children. 
We look for strategic time allocation quantitatively by testing whether adults 
systematically alter their activities when a spouse is away from Amankwu in order to take 
advantage of how their activities will be less observable to the spouse. In Figure 2A, we 
show suggestive evidence that wives curtail their farm work when their husbands are 
away – a pattern consistent with either complementarity or strategic diversion of effort to 
tasks with greater personal returns. As this may, however, be contaminated by individual 
heterogeneity and seasonality, we also present regression estimates of (1). There is little 
evidence of this in Table 6. This finding is not surprising, since it is visible contributions 
to production that increase bargaining power, and since there may be greater incentives to 
continue one’s own work rather than to divert one’s time to rest or to benefit the absent 
spouse. Indeed, although women are more likely to go to market or to rest when their 
husbands are away, these effects are statistically insignificant. Men are more likely to 
engage in childcare (a typically female activity) when their wives are away.  
Though we have found no quantitative evidence that individuals in the sample take 
advantage of a spouse’s absence to work on their own account, the ethnographic evidence 
reveals some exceptions. Wives sometimes make out-of-town visits while their husbands 
are away at court, at market, making social visits of their own, or home resting (Uda & 
Ejere 5/3/39, 18/4/39, & 29/4/39; Ezeala & Alozia 1/6/39; Uda & Ekeru 10/5/39).  
The ethnographic evidence suggests that individuals misuse their time in visible ways, 
duplicating effort and engaging in work in which they lack a comparative advantage. This 
can be understood using Basu’s framework. Individuals can over-supply work in order to 
increase their bargaining power, or be prevented by a powerful spouse from undertaking 
activities that would increase their future power. This echoes findings from cooperative 
game theory concerning the over-provision of effort, and arises from limited commitment 
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(Browning, 1982, 1983; Browning et al., 2014). For instance, individuals frequently help 
their spouses farm or prepare food even where the farms and foods in question belong 
explicitly to the spouse, in part to justify claim to a share of the proceeds or reciprocal 
help later. Behaviors such as these invalidate a simpler model with purely exogenous 
distribution factors, since the distribution of output clearly also depends on choices.  
Other narrative evidence reveals that individuals do misallocate their time to tasks 
that make inefficient use of the household’s labor in order to meet other aims. For 
example, Cikia, like “most men,” grows the women’s crops of coco yam and pepper in 
order to increase his bargaining power. By growing these, he is no longer at his mistress 
Eleke and relative Ekodu’s “mercy as regards food” (28/3/39). Such evidence is 
consistent with Harris’ broader impressions of bargaining between spouses over food 
(Harris, 1940), as well as with studies of present-day developing countries such as 
Mexico, India, and Côte d’Ivoire, which find consistent evidence of incomplete income 
pooling especially where it is possible to hide income (Attanasio and Lechene, 2002; de 
Nicola and Giné, 2014; Duflo and Udry, 2004), or in this case, farm or palm wine yields.  
Resources are not pooled and shared fully; ideas of “yours” and “mine” are enforced 
within households, and disputes about food often hinge on the degree to which someone 
has contributed to its production and therefore has a right to its consumption (Mba & 
Ahudiya 1-2/10/39; Afoca 7/5/39; Harris, 1940). For instance, one man cites his help in 
preserving his wife’s corn as a reason he should be able to eat it (Mba, 2/10/39). The 
sharing of resources within the household is often described as a kindness or favor, and 
not a basic expectation of intra-household resource distribution (Ekodu 28/3/39; Ezeala 
15/6/39, 8/7/39, & 9/9/39; Alozia 25/6/39). Indeed, although households cooperate to 
some degree, Harris notes that “keen competition [and] individual 
aggressiveness…sometimes at the expense of one’s own immediate family” is a feature 
of Igbo society (Harris, 1942, p. 53), with reciprocity, retaliation, and non-cooperation 
used as strategies to gain influence over household affairs (Harris, 1940, 1943, 1944). 
As a result of such strategic misallocation of time, households miss opportunities to 
streamline, consolidate, or divide tasks to economize on available labor. For instance, 
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individuals are seen preparing their own food—often due to illness—even when the task 
is opposite-gendered or another individual in the household is already cooking for the rest 
of the family (Onwamini 29/5/39; Ezeala 16/5/39 & 14/2/40). Furthermore, in many 
cases, a woman will forego other work to care for her sick child, even when another co-
wife is already home caring for her own child (Ikoka & Ekeru 1, 16, 23, & 25/6/39). This 
siloed approach to the affairs of “matrifocal units”, even where these units are part of a 
larger household, is a feature in anthropological work on Igbo polygamy (Henderson and 
Henderson, 1966, p. 48; Henderson, 1972, p. 412; Okere, 1979, p. 68; Uchendu, 1965, 
pp. 55 & 188). 
Further, this pattern accords with an endogenous bargaining model of intra-household 
time use. In polygamous households, bargaining power varies with social status and 
influences time use. Senior wives (or senior women more generally), such as Ikoka, 
command greater respect, compliance, and assistance, and have fewer instances of intra-
household conflict than do junior ones such as Ejere (Ikoka 24/4/39 & 20/5/39; Ejere 
29/7/39 & 10/9/39). Early scholarship on the Igbo confirms the position of deference and 
control accorded senior wives (Basden, 1921, pp. 97-8; Leith-Ross, 1939, p. 126). 
Dominance over junior women is also evident in the case of Alozia, who exercises power 
over adult ward Afoca’s time use (1/5/39), likely due both to Alozia’s seniority and 
Afoca’s financial dependence.  
Women’s bargaining power also depends on their position versus the men in their 
household, and varies in response to past actions. That is, it is endogenous in the sense of 
Basu’s model. In acknowledgment that the market is the primary place where women can 
earn cash incomes, and in retaliation for his wife, Alozia, accidentally spilling palm wine, 
Ezeala refuses to let her go to market, calling it “a great punishment not to let a woman 
go” (17/3/39, 14/3/39). However, he worries that because of his punitive action, he will 
spur Alozia to run away to her parents’ home in Ovim (14/3/39), indicating that just as 
controlling household income share matters, so too does assessing another’s social 
networks and outside options. Harris (1940) highlights Igbo women’s successful claims 
over household assets following divorce, and their use of lovers as proxies in land deals 
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in order to circumvent their husbands’ interference. These patterns reinforce the 
importance of women’s options and support networks as sources of leverage. Given the 
fragility of marriages and the variety of options available to a woman seeking to 
“frustrate her husband’s control over her”, Harris finds that the posturing of the sort 
employed above by Ezeala rarely moved past threat into action (Harris, 1940, pp. 144-6). 
Clearly, such strategic misallocation of time, often motivated by intra-household 
bargaining concerns, was an impediment to the most efficient or productive use of 
household resources.
5
 
 
Bargaining and illness 
The work of sick individuals tends to be replaced when they are infrequently ill, when 
the duration of the illness is short, and when the person is a central member of the 
household. Long-term disabilities, infirmity, and pregnancy are treated differently. A man 
might take on “women’s work” for a long period while his wife is expecting, giving birth, 
and recovering (Harris, 1943). Similarly, other members of the household will often work 
on behalf of those too old to work. The chronically ill, however, often go without help. 
Those who suffer frequent and prolonged illness, such as Eleke, Ejere, Ude, Ugwade, and 
Nwayem, have limited bargaining power and rarely get help in replacing their labor when 
sick. Alozia, by contrast, does not face such problems. She is rarely sick, is the socially 
preeminent woman in her household, and has the ready help of Afoca and Onwamini, as 
well as Ezeala, to whom she is sole wife. When Alozia cuts her finger, her husband, 
Ezeala, and ward, Onwamini, perform the more strenuous task of clearing her field while 
she goes to market (1/5/39).  
                                                        
5
 To test for differences between senior wives and other women, we have produced additional quantitative 
results that we do not report. These results are available on request. We have estimated the results 
separately for senior wives and other women. The farm work and palm production of women other than 
senior wives falls in response to spousal illness. Similarly, we find responses to spousal absence mostly 
for women other than senior wives, who reduce harvesting, and palm production, and increase going to 
market. Coordination of farm work is mostly evident for women other than senior wives. These results 
support our main finding that the question of whose work is made up, and who is responsible for 
making this work up, depends on an individual’s social standing within the household. 
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These patterns are consistent with other results concerning poor households. Dercon 
and Krishnan (2000) find that women in poor households have especially little bargaining 
power and so bear the brunt of illness shocks. Liquidity-constrained households in their 
sample are compelled to allocate scarce resources to those members who are more 
productive or more likely to survive. Similarly, Pitt et al. (1990) find that household 
members with better health endowments substitute into heavier work. These individuals, 
then, have the greatest opportunity cost of time when a less healthy household member 
becomes sick. 
Although many tasks appear to lack urgency, one type of work critical enough to be 
frequently addressed by the sick is trade—an activity largely undertaken for one’s own 
enrichment rather than on behalf of the household. Sick individuals often have proxies 
trade on their behalf so as not to miss market days. Alozia sends Onwamini to market 
with money to buy corn for resale when she is home resting with body pain (21/10/39). 
Commercial activities also tend to continue despite illness. Cikia taps his ngwo (wine 
palm) despite having a fever (29/1/40, 30/1/40), and goes to market the same day to sell 
the resulting wine (30/1/40). That such trade-oriented tasks occurred on a rigid external 
timetable governed by market days and offered immediate payoff likely contributed to 
their urgency. Indeed, for women, trade was the principal source of cash income and thus 
enhanced their bargaining power.  
Given the gender division of labor, women’s productive time, and thus their 
bargaining power, is especially hard-hit by child illness. Although Ekodu is able to do the 
home-based work of cracking palm nuts for pay while staying home with her sick child 
(3/1/40), women tend more often to cease all other work and stay home to care for sick 
infants (Ikoka 1, 4, 16-18, 23, 25, 28, & 30/6/39, 1/7/39, 13, 15, & 17/11/39; Ekodu 13 & 
25-26/6/39; Akaji 27/6/39). These patterns are consistent with the results in Pitt and 
Rosenzweig (1990), who find that it is predominantly mothers and older sisters who 
reduce their work effort when a child is ill.  
In cases where a young child is ill, the mother stays home even while other household 
members—including co-wives, daughters, and other junior women—are available (Ikoka 
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1, 4, 16-18, 23, 25, 28, & 30/6/39, 1/7/39, 13, 15, & 17/11/39; Ekodu 13 & 25-26/6/39). 
In more than one case, Ikoka stays home caring for her sick child even while her junior 
co-wife, Ekeru, is already home caring for her own healthy child (1, 16, 23, & 25/6/39), a 
finding which suggests a desire to retain bargaining power by minimizing dependence on 
or indebtedness to others, especially competing wives.  
The old and infirm are treated differently from the chronically ill. Mmeziri and 
Iheukwumere help Egwuonwu when he is ill (19/3/39), but they also do the lion’s share 
of the work in Egwuonwu’s household even when he is well, because he is repeatedly 
stated as being “too old” to work, especially in strenuous tasks or harsh weather (13/2/39, 
13/17/39, 2/3/39). This stands in contrast to the treatment of others who are frequently or 
chronically ill. Although Ugwade is often unable to work due to severe flare-ups of 
venereal disease, her work remains postponed until she is well (12-27/7/39). When her 
lover, Okoro, beats her in a domestic dispute (7/5/39), Ugwade is unable to work for a 
week (14/5/39). Although she had been clearing her field (5/5/39) and going to market 
(6/5/39) immediately prior to her beating, there is no indication that anyone tended to her 
farm or went to market on her behalf during her recuperation. Similarly, Nwayem, who 
suffers from leprosy, and Ude, who suffers from gonorrhea, have frequent and prolonged 
illness but go without help (Nwayem 6-8/11/39 & 23/12/39-6/2/40; Ude 21-23, 25, & 27-
28/10/39 & 12-19 & 21-22/12/39). Their isolation in small and semi-independent sub-
households, combined with their near-outcast status, means that they have few healthy 
helpers.  
There are a number of reasons for this collection of findings. First, the healthy 
members of a sick individual’s household often have other, more pressing 
responsibilities. For example, during Ejere’s illness, Uda has political responsibilities that 
make it difficult for him to make up others’ work (15/3/39). Further, the state of 
household relationships also governs who receives help. Uda has time to harvest the 
healthy Ekeru’s coco yams while Ejere is sick, although he offers Ejere no such help 
(23/3/39). An analogous situation occurs when Eleke is sick; Cikia helps his relative 
Ekodu harvest her yams, while his mistress Eleke’s work goes un-replaced (22/4/39). 
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Last, Igbo society is gerontocratic. Many of the older persons in the sample, such as 
Egwuonwu, are officially “elders” whose ceremonial and political duties accord them the 
deference of the younger household members.  
  
Bargaining and child labor 
Intra-household bargaining power also motivated children’s time use—for instance, 
because children wished to earn independent incomes and thus bolster their position 
within the household, because a child’s poor standing within the household obligated him 
or her to work for more powerful household members, or because their parents’ 
bargaining power dictated how and for whom they worked. 
As with adults, in order to maintain their claim over household resources, children 
were expected to contribute their time to the household. In our data, help in farm work 
and household errands were means by which children contributed to the household, 
earned their keep, and reciprocated contributions made by their parents. For example, 
Akoma cuts palm fruits for his mother, “who helps in his school needs” (13/1/40), and 
the ward Onwamini is frequently sent on errands by Ezeala (25/1/40, 7/1/40, 11/9/39). 
Children are also found engaging in activities such as mat-making and palm harvesting in 
return for their school fees, or as a "token of appreciation" for their parents' help with 
fees. Children like Omenyenya and Akoma perform farm work, palm harvesting, and 
mat-making for this reason (Omenyenya 5/8/39, Akoma 13/1/40).  Parents express anger 
and frustration when children refuse to help, which suggests that such chores are 
expected as a basic household contribution (Introductory section– File C; Cikia 5-6/3/39; 
Ofruice 25/5/39, 21/6/39, 11/7/39, & 30/1/40; Uce 9/11/39; Omenyenya 28/12/39; 
Onwamini 18/1/40). 
Indeed, although older children may have pursued activities for their own benefit, 
such as hunting, trade, and recreation, they tended to do so only when they had fulfilled 
their farming and gathering responsibilities (Ofruice 16/2/39 & 30/8/39, Omenyenya 
9/7/39 & 21/10/39, Mmeziri 1/8/39 & 31/10/39, Onwamini 30/3/39 & 10/11/39). In one 
instance, Uda prevents his son Akoma from going to church so that he may instead farm 
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on Uda’s behalf, scornfully adding that he “only sent Akoma to school to learn books and 
not to go to church” (10/12/39). Parents cite disobedience and failure to cooperate with 
farming and household help as grounds for non-payment of school fees and related 
expenses, as is the case with Cikia and his adoptive son Kalu. Kalu was compelled to quit 
school for two months when his father “refused to pay his school fees because Kalu 
refused to work for him” (Introductory section – File C).  
The expectations of older children, wards, and the children of frequently sick or 
absent parents were particularly demanding. Instead of merely accompanying their 
parents to the farm to assist in peripheral tasks, these children work independently on 
behalf of their parents, doing the full work of adults: they plant, harvest, and supervise 
hired workers (Onwamini 5/2/40, Ezeala 11/4/39, Mmeziri 18/3/39, 21/3/39, & 15/5/39).  
Wards like Onwamini were especially seen as needing to earn their keep, since the social 
obligation of household heads to support them—and thus these wards’ intra-household 
position—was not as strong as with biological children (Ugwade & Akaji 9/9/39). Such 
children can be seen managing other smaller children in the performance of farming 
tasks. During the month when Uda is serving as a member of court, his son Akoma is put 
in charge of managing his younger siblings and cousins (18, 25, 27, & 29/11/39; 10, 12, 
15, 21, 23, & 29/12/39; 6/1/40).  
Thus, parents are seen using their control over the allocation of resources to direct 
children’s time use, consistent with an endogenous bargaining power framework similar 
to that of Basu. In this model, it is not just that the (more powerful) parent can compel the 
(less powerful) child to work; the spousal balance of power may also influence how the 
child’s time is allocated. For instance, mothers may be less willing than fathers to 
encourage child work not only because they may more completely internalize its 
disutility to the child, but also because they may lack the bargaining power to fully 
appropriate its returns. We observe behaviors consistent with this. One male household 
head, Ezeala, largely monopolizes and thus fails to limit the labor of his ward. He 
occasionally lends the boy’s help to his wife, but more often he sets the ward to work for 
him in tasks such as farming and errands, even using the ward to fulfil his own reciprocal 
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labor obligations to others when he himself is too busy to go (17/3/39). Similarly, in 
Cikia’s household, whether his mistress Eleke’s high status relative to his brother’s 
widow Ekodu is a function of the former’s status as mistress or her husband’s preference 
for her, the labor of Ekodu’s own children, Kalu and Ofruice, is more frequently 
commandeered by Cikia to aid Eleke than to help their own mother (Kalu 8/5/39, 
13/5/39, & 6/6/39).  
Not all child labor is a matter of simple obligation, or of maintaining some static 
share of household resources: children also work in order to increase their own 
bargaining power. Moehling (2005), for example, finds that children in the early 
twentieth century United States who contributed to household income had more influence 
on household spending patterns. Children with independent incomes also enjoyed better 
outside options and thus strengthened their bargaining position vis-à-vis their parents. To 
this end, children frequently work voluntarily in trading and the production of palm 
produce for sale, which allowed children not only to learn trade and business basics 
important in adult life, but also to earn independent and discretionary cash income. In an 
example that is especially telling of the possibility of child labor contributing to a child’s 
autonomy, one child, Cikia, uses money earned working on others’ farms (22/2/39, 
12/3/39) to secure the financial independence needed to disobey his father (5-6/3/39), and 
eventually to run away indefinitely (14/5/39). 
Of all non-farm activities, children play an especially significant role in palm 
production, an activity which in turn allows opportunities for children to earn 
independent income. Girls such as Ofruice, Nwangras, and Elebe often help the senior 
woman in their household as she cracks and pounds palm nuts for the production and 
subsequent sale of palm oil (Elebe 14/2/39 & 21/1/40; Ofruice 22 & 24-25/8/39, 17 & 
19/1/40). At other times, these girls perform these same activities and keep the proceeds 
for themselves (Mmeziri 31/5/39 & 17-19/1/40; Nwangras 7/10/39, 13/1/40, 18/1/40, & 
7/2/40).  
Through such independent activity, children also learned skills that would help them 
in adulthood (Harris, 1943), a fact which the residents of Amankwu recognized. Uce’s 
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unsuccessful hunting of lizards is described as “learning” (14/2/39). Ofruice has a farm in 
which she grows small amounts of corn, pepper, okra, and cocoyams. Ezeala describes 
this as “the way young girls learn to farm” (4/4/39). Onwamini learns to tap palm wine 
by doing so directly (26/7/39).  
Of course, not all child work was voluntary. Children in the data are sometimes 
“dragged” to work when disobedient (Mba & Omenyenya 28/12/39). Refusal to work is 
punished in many ways, including beatings and refusal by parents to pay school fees 
(Eleke & Ofruice 26/5/39; Mba & Omenyenya 28/12/39; Kalu 22/3/39), again suggesting 
that intra-household bargaining forces and time use choices depended on one-another, 
both in parent-child and spousal contexts. 
In sum, the patterns in child labor we observe demonstrate that decisions over the 
time use of children were constrained by the complementarity of child and adult labor 
within the household, economies of scope in the combination of child labor with child 
supervision, unequal claims within the household over the fruits of child work, and the 
capacity of children to accumulate bargaining power through their choices. All of these 
factors may have contributed to suboptimal time allocation and to lower levels of 
household productivity and income. 
 
7. Robustness 
 
Our baseline analysis codes individual activities as dummies for whether an activity 
was performed on a certain day. In many cases, however, individuals provide additional 
information on when they performed an activity and how long it took. We have converted 
our daily dummies for each activity into measures of time actually used in fractions of a 
typical ten hour day. Because most activities lack precise information on start and end 
times, we have had to infer durations from terse descriptions and, in many cases, assume 
that activities are equally spaced over the day.
6
 We report summary statistics for these 
                                                        
6
 In particular, we assign the following hourly durations to each of the following descriptors: 
3  A few hours  2 Early afternoon 
0.5  A few minutes  2 Early morning 
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recoded measures of activity in Table 7. We repeat the baseline analysis of Tables 3, 4 
and 5 using these recoded measures in Tables 8, 9 and 10. Results are qualitatively 
similar to our baseline results. 
We report a series of robustness exercises in the appendix tables. We use Appendix C 
to discuss missing data (Table A1). Spouses tend to be missing from the record on the 
same day, although there is little evidence that the probability that one spouse’s activities 
are reported depend on what the other spouse is doing. Children, by contrast, are less 
likely to be reported when a parent is also missing from the data, or when a parent is 
engaged in going to market, hunting, or sick. 
We report results with Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) standard errors clustered 
by both individual and day in Tables A2-A4. These are similar to our baseline estimates. 
Our main results remain largely unchanged if we include lagged dependent variables in 
all specifications (not reported). 
In the appendix tables, we show that the empirical results are similar when own 
illness is included as a control (Table A5). Extending illness shocks to cover any illness 
within the past week, we continue to find that individuals curtail work in response to own 
illness but do not increase it in response to the illness of a spouse, excepting men 
harvesting and attending market (Table A7). To capture the effect of illness duration, we 
also extend the analysis of Table 4 by estimating (1) including both a dummy for whether 
person j is ill and the number of days that person j has been ill (not reported). In the own-
illness regressions for women, we find that for many activities, work resumes as sickness 
drags on. For example, a man is less likely to farm on a day he is ill, but this effect 
diminishes each additional day he is sick. In the sample of women, we find no significant 
positive coefficients on the length of a husband’s illness that would suggest women 
become more likely to make up for a husband’s lost labor the longer he is sick.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
1  A short time  3 Evening 
1  A while   2 Late afternoon 
5  Afternoon  2 Late night 
5  All afternoon  5 Morning 
10  All day   10 Most of day 
5  All morning  8 Night 
8  All night  5 Part of the day 
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We show in the appendix tables that the empirical results are similar when controlling 
for a child’s own illness (Table A6). If we expand definitions of parental time use to 
cover activities within the past week, we find less evidence of coordination, though 
coordination in several types of farm work remains (Table A8). Discarding the two 
children aged 8-10, we continue to find evidence of coordination with parental time in 
farming (Table A9).  
In Table A10, we report results with more aggregated categories of time use. We 
define “any farm work” as an indicator for farming (or any category such as harvesting) 
or palm production. We define “non-farm work” as child care, cooking, fetching water, 
food preparation, gathering, home repair, hunting, making mats, going to market, or road 
work. We define “any leisure” as beauty, hosting, or recreation. Many of the general 
patterns visible in more disaggregated categories are still apparent here: work reduces in 
response to own illness but does not increase in response to spousal illness. For women, 
responses to spousal illness are negative but insignificant. There is evidence of weak 
same-gender substitutability in non-farm work for men. Children do not replace sick 
parents, but rather coordinate their time with their parents. Where results change is in 
spousal coordination. The tendency to engage in the same activity on the same day 
uncovered with more disaggregate categories is not apparent here. This is not surprising: 
the task specialization that allows complementarities to arise will exist within an activity 
such as palm production, and not from palm production to, say, farm clearing. 
We have also aggregated activities as essential (care for own child, any childcare, 
cooking, care for another’s child, eating, farmed, farm clearing, farm harvesting, other 
farm work, farm planting, fetching water, food preparation, gathering, hunting, latrine, 
and palm production) and non-essential (all other activities coded in the data).  Results 
for these categories are presented in Table A11. Individuals move from essential to 
inessential activities when ill; women reduce essential activities when their husbands are 
ill; children perform more essential work when their parents farm; children coordinate 
with their parents on essential work, and; spouses coordinate on inessential work. 
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In addition, we have aggregated activities into eight categories that are less broad than 
in the previous two exercises. In particular, we have collapsed activities into housework 
(cooking, fetching water, food preparation, gathering, home repair, and making mats), 
personal care (bathing, eating), childcare (care for own child, cared for child), leisure 
(beauty, recreation, resting), market work (palm production, went to market), farming and 
hunting (all types of farm work, hunting) sick and away (away and sick), and community 
obligations (visiting, hosting, religious duties, and road clearing). We have presented 
these results in Table A12. The results suggest that individuals reduce housework, 
farming and hunting, and community obligations when ill, in favor of personal care and 
leisure. There is again no evidence of substitution across spouses in farm work or palm 
production. There is no evidence children substitute for ill parents, though they do 
coordinate across a range of activities. Spousal coordination in this table is limited to 
market work. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have used anthropological data to show that the structure of African 
households and the incentives that they faced shaped their time allocation in an historical 
context. The lack of labor substitution in response to illness, the coordination of labor 
between spouses, the coordination of labor between parents and children, and the 
strategic misallocation of labor that we observe are consistent with endogenously-formed 
bargaining power and with intra-household labor complementarities that stem partly from 
task specialization given by the gender division of labor. In particular, we have found 
very little evidence of labor substitution within households. However, there is also little 
quantitative evidence to suggest any correlation between the illness shocks faced by one 
adult in the household and the work of other adults. The ethnographic evidence reveals 
patterns consistent with strategic labor misallocation and shows strong evidence of a 
largely cultural gender division of labor. We have also found that child labor interacts 
with adult labor in a complex way: it is complementary with child care, it is partly a 
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means by which children learn and, for older children, it can contribute to the child’s 
bargaining power within the household. 
Our results have implications for African development. Both historical and modern 
literatures question the capacity of African households to allocate their time efficiently. 
Historians have debated the amount of slack time African households had available to 
allocate in response to historical changes in incentives (Austin, 2014), while development 
economists have argued that household forms prevalent in Africa have prevented 
households from achieving efficiency in investment, labor allocation, consumption 
choices, and input use (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Udry, 1996). In 
our data, the lack of labor substitution in response to illness, coupled with the 
coordination of labor between spouses and between parents and children, made illness 
especially costly: when one individual falls ill, it compromises the ability of even those 
who are well to use their time productively. Accordingly in these households, labor 
complementarity has the potential to amplify household income losses due to health 
shocks. Strategic misallocation of labor, similarly, constrained the abilities of African 
households to allocate their time productively, and so limited their efficiency. To wit, 
households often find healthy adults completely idle when another is sick (e.g. Uda 
8/12/39, Cikia 2/8/39), while in others, individuals wastefully duplicate childcare and 
vegetable cultivation tasks in order to maintain an edge in household bargaining (e.g. 
Cikia 28/3/1939, Ikoka 23/6/39). Such constraints on labor, whether culturally imposed 
or stemming from real features of the technology of agricultural production, could 
contribute to low levels of welfare in these and similar contemporary African households.  
Our study has drawn on data from a single Nigerian society in the colonial period. 
Clearly, then, the details of the technological constrains and cultural forms they took as 
given will be specific to the context. We believe, however, that our work has broader 
relevance. In finding that illness shocks are compounded by labor complementarities 
(Adhvaryu and Nyshadham, 2014), in stressing that household bargaining considerations 
can produce inefficient outcomes (Jakiela and Ozier, 2015), and in highlighting 
complexities in the dynamics of child labor (Basu, 2006), we show that the 
considerations motivating the households in our sample parallel those facing many 
present-day households operating both in Africa and throughout the developing world.  
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Figure 1A. Responses to spousal illness: Farmed 
  
Notes: This figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval for the mean for the variable 
"farmed," conditional on whether an individual has a spouse who was sick (1), or not (0). 
Confidence intervals containing zero not drawn. 
 
  
Figure 1B. Responses to spousal illness: Went to market  
 
Notes: This figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval for the mean for the variable 
"went to market," conditional on whether an individual has a spouse who was sick (1), or not (0). 
Confidence intervals containing zero not drawn. 
  
Figure 1C. Responses to spousal illness: Palm production 
 
Notes: This figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval for the mean for the variable 
"palm production," conditional on whether an individual has a spouse who was sick (1), or not 
(0). Confidence intervals containing zero not drawn. 
  
 Figure 2A. Coordination – Farming and Spousal Absence 
 
Notes: This figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval for the mean for the variable 
"farmed," conditional on whether an individual has a spouse who was away from Amankwu (1), 
or not (0). Confidence intervals containing zero not drawn. 
  
Figure 2B. Coordination – Farming and spouse farmed 
 
Notes: This figure presents the mean and 95% confidence interval for the mean for the variable 
"farmed," conditional on whether an individual has a spouse who was ) also engaged in farming 
(1), or not (0. Confidence intervals containing zero not drawn. 
 
Name Sex Age Spouses Parents (incl. adoptive)
Afoca f 23-25 Ezeala
Alozia f 34-36 Ezeala
Ezeala m 35-38 Alozia
Onwamini m 12-14 Ezeala
Cikia m 42-45 Eleke
Ekodu f 30-33
Eleke f 35-37 Cikia
Kalu m 12-14 Cikia, Ekodu
Ofruice f 8-10 Cikia, Ekodu
Ahudiya f 22-24 Mba
Amabua f
Mba m 24-26 Ahudiya Amabua
Omenyenya m 10-10 Amabua
Akaji f 30-32
Akoma m 10-12 Ikoka, Uda
Ejere f 30-32 Uda
Ekeru f 24-26 Uda
Ikoka f 32-35 Uda
Uda m 50-53 Ejere, Ekeru, Ikoka
Ugwade f 29-31 Uda
Cikia m 16-18 Egwuonwu
Egwuonwu m 57-60
Iheukwumere m 22-24 Mmeziri Egwuonwu
Mmeziri f 8-10 Iheukwumere
Egwuonwu
Mba
Table 1: Individuals in regressions and their relationships as coded
Ezeala
Uda
Cikia
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Men Women Children
Cared for child 0.096 0.028 0.148 * 0.069
Farmed 0.302 0.282 0.327 0.270
Farm work - clearing 0.028 0.050 0.016 *** 0.025 **
Farm work - harvesting 0.129 0.083 0.154 ** 0.134
Farm work - planting 0.064 0.046 0.083 * 0.043
Gathering 0.111 0.094 0.112 0.135
Hunting 0.020 0.042 0.001 0.034
Went to market 0.137 0.153 0.143 0.098
Palm production 0.049 0.041 0.055 0.045
Resting 0.263 0.315 0.222 0.288
Sick 0.054 0.042 0.066 0.042
Making mats 0.019 0.049 0.001 *** 0.019 **
N 6,266 1,893 3,134 1,239
Table 2: Means
Notes: All variables are binary 0/1 indicators. Stars indicate statistical significance in a regression of
the row variable on a dummy for adult female and a dummy for child, with standard errors clustered
by individual. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Complementary Substitutable
Spouse-spouse Farmed Went to market
Farm work – clearing Farm work - harvesting
Farm work – planting
Palm production
Cared for child
Parent-child Farmed Cared for child
Farm work – clearing Went to market
Farm work – planting Gathering
Farm work - harvesting
Palm production
Making mats 
Table 3: Complementarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Sick -0.001 -0.185 0.001 -0.042 -0.018 -0.086 -0.012 -0.042 -0.010 0.007 0.313 1.000
   Men (N=1,893) (0.011) (0.032)*** (0.020) (0.024) (0.011) (0.022)*** (0.019) (0.013)** (0.022) (0.032) (0.041)*** (0.000)***
Sick -0.074 -0.376 -0.028 -0.191 -0.073 -0.130 -0.001 0.005 -0.102 -0.053 0.679 1.000
   Women (N=3,134) (0.054) (0.024)*** (0.009)** (0.044)*** (0.018)*** (0.029)*** (0.002) (0.004) (0.025)*** (0.016)*** (0.026)*** (0.000)***
Spouse : Sick 0.015 0.061 -0.018 0.067 0.004 -0.018 0.011 -0.018 0.022 -0.046 -0.010 0.012
   Men (N=1,388) (0.016) (0.028)* (0.023) (0.028)* (0.028) (0.024) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.034) (0.024) (0.009)
Spouse : Sick -0.042 -0.234 -0.015 -0.041 -0.120 -0.002 0.073 -0.061 -0.031 -0.033 0.118
   Women (N=1,786) (0.104) (0.147) (0.006)* (0.112) (0.065) (0.025) (0.037) (0.068) (0.015) (0.062) (0.036)**
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick -0.004 -0.038 0.004 -0.076 0.025 -0.008 0.018 -0.016 0.047 -0.027 -0.119 -0.184
   Men (N=1,893) (0.014) (0.055) (0.028) (0.026)** (0.026) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.079) (0.195)
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.015 0.025 0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.024 0.001 0.003 0.012 -0.009 -0.099 -0.121
   Women (N=3,134) (0.028) (0.031) (0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.022) (0.001) (0.003) (0.020) (0.016) (0.051)* (0.070)
Children : Sick -0.020 0.034 0.031 -0.021 0.014 -0.032 -0.007 -0.023 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.016
   Men (N=1,082) (0.055) (0.037) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.039) (0.013) (0.046) (0.006)*
Table 4: Responses to illness
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard errors
clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Parents : Sick -0.106 -0.118 -0.055 -0.058 -0.041 0.027 0.092 -0.005 -0.161 0.065 0.114 0.051
   Children (N=953) (0.087) (0.116) (0.045) (0.052) (0.031) (0.057) (0.073) (0.022) (0.067)* (0.093) (0.145) (0.050)
Parents : Farmed 0.050 0.202 0.006 0.102 0.037 0.001 -0.021 0.016 -0.010 -0.012 -0.096 -0.033
   Children (N=953) (0.028) (0.047)** (0.029) (0.015)*** (0.013)** (0.033) (0.015) (0.013) (0.025) (0.018) (0.042)* (0.015)*
Parents : Palm production -0.030 -0.031 -0.011 0.029 -0.069 0.080 -0.012 0.002 0.026 0.102 0.029 -0.022
   Children (N=953) (0.023) (0.070) (0.029) (0.087) (0.030)* (0.039) (0.019) (0.007) (0.038) (0.026)** (0.048) (0.021)
Parents : Same Activity -0.165 0.202 0.375 0.102 0.284 0.090 0.068 0.193 0.050 0.102 0.036 0.051
   Children (N=953) (0.092) (0.047)** (0.157)* (0.045)* (0.029)*** (0.023)** (0.026)* (0.052)** (0.051) (0.026)** (0.027) (0.050)
Parents : Resting -0.015 -0.044 -0.007 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.004 -0.014 -0.008 0.019 0.031
   Children (N=931) (0.016) (0.043) (0.017) (0.036) (0.010) (0.026) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.021) (0.028) (0.005)***
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard
errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Table 5: Child labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Spouse : Away 0.075 -0.013 -0.016 0.014 -0.040 0.049 -0.031 0.031 -0.007 -0.002 -0.078 0.008
   Men (N=1,388) (0.023)** (0.061) (0.018) (0.057) (0.014)** (0.033) (0.055) (0.017) (0.039) (0.025) (0.069) (0.021)
Spouse : Away 0.115 -0.102 -0.006 -0.098 0.014 -0.057 -0.004 0.130 -0.050 0.192 -0.042
   Women (N=1,786) (0.103) (0.063) (0.006) (0.068) (0.076) (0.040) (0.002) (0.098) (0.122) (0.159) (0.096)
Spouse: Same Activity -0.084 0.081 0.321 0.074 0.246 0.069 0.098 0.570 0.024 0.329 -0.006 0.012
   Men (N=1,388) (0.041) (0.051) (0.110)** (0.033)* (0.042)*** (0.035) (0.038)* (0.079)*** (0.055) (0.106)** (0.020) (0.009)
Spouse: Same Activity -0.085 0.051 0.160 0.055 0.312 0.061 0.031 -0.047 0.524 -0.007 0.118
   Women (N=1,786) (0.074) (0.048) (0.073)* (0.041) (0.097)** (0.032) (0.022) (0.053) (0.037)*** (0.033) (0.036)**
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends.
Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Table 6: Coordination between spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Men Women Children
Cared for child 0.831 0.170 1.303 * 0.649
Farmed 1.970 1.969 2.068 1.722
Farm work - clearing 0.222 0.391 0.126 *** 0.204 **
Farm work - harvesting 0.523 0.343 0.616 * 0.563
Farm work - planting 0.537 0.408 0.677 0.381
Gathering 0.488 0.331 0.560 0.544
Hunting 0.123 0.265 0.006 0.201
Went to market 1.032 0.903 1.236 0.710
Palm production 0.314 0.217 0.375 0.308
Resting 1.878 1.990 1.660 2.258
Sick 0.542 0.421 0.666 0.414
Making mats 0.092 0.217 0.003 *** 0.126
N 6,266 1,893 3,134 1,239
Table 7: Means (Hours based on 10 hour day)
Notes: Stars indicate statistical significance in a regression of the row variable on a dummy for adult
female and a dummy for child, with standard errors clustered by individual. *** Significant at 1%, **
Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Sick 0.003 -0.150 -0.012 -0.019 -0.019 -0.029 -0.003 -0.015 -0.003 -0.005 0.273 1.000
   Men (N=1,893) (0.004) (0.023)*** (0.015) (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.008)** (0.010) (0.005)** (0.013) (0.013) (0.050)*** (0.000)***
Sick -0.051 -0.240 -0.023 -0.083 -0.061 -0.065 -0.001 0.000 -0.101 -0.032 0.703 1.000
   Women (N=3,134) (0.043) (0.026)*** (0.009)** (0.019)*** (0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.001) (0.000) (0.030)*** (0.012)** (0.037)*** (0.000)***
Spouse : Sick 0.013 0.050 -0.017 0.027 0.001 0.005 0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.017 -0.028 0.013
   Men (N=1,388) (0.014) (0.017)** (0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (0.003) (0.021) (0.005) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012)* (0.011)
Spouse : Sick -0.004 -0.170 -0.005 -0.018 -0.073 0.011 0.008 -0.004 -0.018 0.003 0.117
   Women (N=1,786) (0.081) (0.083)* (0.004) (0.040) (0.032)* (0.014) (0.003)** (0.042) (0.009)* (0.037) (0.020)***
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick 0.002 0.013 0.002 -0.035 0.032 -0.011 0.018 -0.006 0.040 0.007 -0.087 -0.183
   Men (N=1,893) (0.005) (0.038) (0.022) (0.015)* (0.025) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.016)* (0.054) (0.078) (0.192)
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.007 0.029 0.005 0.004 -0.010 0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.103 -0.122
   Women (N=3,134) (0.023) (0.026) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.003) (0.000) (0.012) (0.008) (0.049)* (0.067)*
Children : Sick -0.025 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.018 -0.029 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.037 0.019
   Men (N=1,082) (0.029) (0.044) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002)*** (0.018) (0.007) (0.031) (0.010) (0.051) (0.016)
Table 8: Responses to illness - Activities based on ten hour day
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard errors
clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Parents : Sick -0.083 -0.040 -0.027 -0.020 -0.027 0.005 0.063 -0.005 -0.130 0.056 0.167 -0.001
   Children (N=953) (0.073) (0.075) (0.022) (0.016) (0.025) (0.019) (0.043) (0.018) (0.044)** (0.070) (0.097) (0.036)
Parents : Farmed 0.063 0.164 0.004 0.029 0.078 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.028 -0.122 -0.045
   Children (N=953) (0.048) (0.041)** (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)*** (0.021) (0.019) (0.008) (0.028) (0.015) (0.077) (0.029)
Parents : Palm production -0.003 -0.093 0.011 -0.015 -0.091 0.049 -0.040 0.018 0.007 0.138 0.042 0.050
   Children (N=953) (0.020) (0.039)* (0.034) (0.025) (0.045) (0.008)*** (0.018)* (0.009) (0.015) (0.049)** (0.036) (0.042)
Parents : Same Activity -0.188 0.164 0.395 0.084 0.279 0.068 0.029 0.381 0.004 0.138 0.110 -0.001
   Children (N=953) (0.105) (0.041)** (0.160)* (0.064) (0.038)*** (0.040) (0.014) (0.107)** (0.022) (0.049)** (0.045)* (0.036)
Parents : Resting -0.075 0.011 -0.007 0.030 0.012 0.013 -0.009 0.005 0.002 -0.019 0.088 0.051
   Children (N=931) (0.039) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011)** (0.016) (0.017) (0.005) (0.014) (0.030) (0.024) (0.044) (0.036)
Table 9: Child labor - Activities based on ten hour day
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard
errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Spouse : Away 0.017 -0.013 -0.032 0.005 -0.024 0.020 -0.015 0.027 -0.037 0.003 -0.028 -0.001
   Men (N=1,388) (0.004)** (0.031) (0.020) (0.014) (0.008)** (0.013) (0.028) (0.009)** (0.030) (0.013) (0.045) (0.014)
Spouse : Away 0.374 -0.133 -0.012 -0.078 -0.026 -0.039 -0.000 0.079 -0.070 0.009 -0.112
   Women (N=1,786) (0.175)* (0.088) (0.009) (0.056) (0.127) (0.050) (0.000) (0.104) (0.159) (0.292) (0.233)
Spouse: Same Activity -0.026 0.085 0.456 0.103 0.320 0.050 0.270 0.831 0.028 0.236 -0.014 0.013
   Men (N=1,388) (0.011)* (0.032)* (0.141)** (0.037)** (0.045)*** (0.017)** (0.030)*** (0.102)*** (0.030) (0.108)* (0.023) (0.011)
Spouse: Same Activity -0.080 0.054 0.200 0.080 0.425 0.068 0.012 0.019 0.741 -0.082 0.117
   Women (N=1,786) (0.084) (0.026)* (0.104) (0.038)* (0.092)*** (0.038) (0.010) (0.059) (0.091)*** (0.029)** (0.020)***
Table 10: Coordination between spouses - Activities based on ten hour day
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends.
Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
APPENDIX FOR “INTRA-HOUSEHOLD LABOR ALLOCATION IN COLONIAL NIGERIA” 
 
  
APPENDIX A: LIST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO APPEAR REGULARLY IN THE DATA 
 
Household 1: Ezeala 
 Ezeala (Male, 35-38) is the head of household and husband of Alozia. He is in the process 
of marrying a young second wife in Ndiagbo. 
 Alozia (Female, 34-36) is the wife of Ezeala. She has been infertile during her marriage 
to Ezeala, but bore three children with her previous (deceased) husband. 
 Afoca (Female, 23-25) is a relative of Ezeala. He treats her as his daughter. She helps and 
works for Alozia in return for room and board. 
 Onwamini (Male, 12-14) is a half-brother and informally adopted son of Ezeala. 
 
Household 2: Cikia 
 Cikia (Male, 42-45) is the head of household and lover of Eleke. 
 Eleke (Female, 35-37) is Cikia’s mistress. Her husband is deceased. 
 Ekodu (Female, 30-33) is a relative of Cikia who has lived with him since her husband’s 
death. She is the mother of Kalu, Ofruice, and a small baby. 
 Kalu (Male, 12-14) is the son of Ekodu and an informally adopted son of Cikia. 
 Ofruice (Female, 8-10) is the daughter of Ekodu and an informally adopted daughter of 
Cikia. 
 Ada (Female, age unknown) is the daughter by another wife of Ekodu’s deceased 
husband. 
 
Household 3: Mba 
 Mba (Male, 24-26) is the head of household and husband of Ahudiya. 
 Ahudiya (Female, 22-24) is the wife of Mba. She is mother of Mary, Uce, and a newborn 
baby. 
 Amabua (Female, age unknown) is mother of Mba and Omenyenya. She lives semi-
independently near Mba. She is the village elder among women. 
 Omenyenya (Male, 10) is son of Amabua and half-brother of Mba. 
 Mary (Female, 3) is a daughter of Mba and Ahudiya. 
 Uce (Male, 6) is a son of Mba and Ahudiya. 
 Nwayem (Female, 30-32) is a sister of Mba, a mother of a young son, and is a leper. 
 
Household 4: Uda 
 Uda (Male, 50-53) is the head of household and husband of Ikoka, Ekeru, and Ejere. He is 
a village elder and court member. 
 Ikoka (Female, 32-35) is a wife of Uda. She is mother of Akoma, Wankem, Elebe, and 
Sunday. 
 Ejere (Female, 30-32) is a wife of Uda. She is mother of an infant or young child. 
 Ekeru (Female, 24-26) is a wife of Uda. She is mother of the infant Onukafo. 
 Elebe (Female, 13-14) is a daughter of Uda and Ikoka. She is recently out of the fattening 
house, in which she rested and gained weight before marriage. 
 Wankem (Female, 6-7) is a daughter of Uda and Ikoka. 
 Obasi (Male, 24-26) is a son of Uda. He is a trader at Uzuakoli who returns frequently to 
help Uda. 
 Akoma (Male, 10-12) is a son of Uda and Ikoka. 
 Ugwade (Female, 29-31) is a daughter of Uda who has run away from her husband in 
Isiegbu. 
 Ugoma (Female, 35-39) is a wife of Uda’s deceased brother. She is fed by Uda, and is 
mother of a young son. 
 Akaji (Female, 30-32) is a wife of Uda’s deceased brother. She is mother of Mbanta and 
another young child. 
 Mbanta (Male, 8-10) is a son of Akaji. 
 Asehoro (Female, 6-8) is a young granddaughter or niece of Uda. 
 Ude (Female, 25) is a daughter of Uda and full sister of Ugwade. She returns to Uda’s 
household to manage Ugwade’s farm in Ugwade’s absence. 
 Onoghare (Female, 5) is a daughter of Ude and her lover. 
 
Household 5: Egwuonwu 
 Egwuonwu (Male, 57-60) is the head of household. His wife is deceased. He is the 
village’s religious elder. 
 Iheukwumere (Male, 22-24) is a son of Egwuonwu. He is in the process of marrying 
Mmeziri.  
 Mmeziri (Female, 8-10) is the intended wife of Iheukwumere. She is the de facto manager 
of the household. 
 Cikia (Male, 16-18) is a son of Egwuonwu. 
 Nwangras (Female, 13-14) is a daughter of Egwuonwu. She is recently out of the 
fattening house, and a bride price is currently being paid on her. 
 
The individuals in the regression subsample and the number of times they appear are, by 
household: 
Cikia Cikia 315 
Cikia Ekodu 316 
Cikia Eleke 276 
Cikia Kalu 110 
Cikia Ofruice 290 
Egwuonwu Cikia 118 
Egwuonwu Egwuonwu 318 
Egwuonwu Iheukwumere 190 
Egwuonwu Mmeziri 280 
Ezeala Afoca 262 
Ezeala Alozia 322 
Ezeala Ezeala 322 
Ezeala Onwamini 293 
Mba Ahudiya 308 
Mba Amabua 278 
Mba Mba 316 
Mba Omenyenya 129 
Uda Akaji 275 
Uda Akoma 137 
Uda Ejere 297 
Uda Ekeru 308 
Uda Ikoka 315 
Uda Uda 314 
Uda Ugwade 177 
 
 
  
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE RECORD 
 
Mon. July 10 
Afonso. 
 
Ezeala - 7 to 7:30, to bush to cut sticks to rebuild our okoro house. All the man of Amankwu 
from age grade of about 45-50 years down to 13 -15 years worked on this. Then we continued 
to work building the house until 2p.m. Then I slept until 6p.m. 
Meals: 
(1) 9 a.m. Otara stockfish in ofo 
(2) 1 p.m. boiled yam with Ihenduri (no meat or fish) also Otara - stockfish in ofo. 
(3) 2 p.m. Otara - stockfish in ofo. 1 ear of roasted corn. 
(4) 8 p.m. Otara - nnama meat in ofo. 
Many showers during day, but no continuous rain. 
Alozia - 7 to 4, to Court Farm IIA to plant odudu. Went with Afoca. 
Afoca - See Alozia. 
Onwamini - Att Ibeku. 
 
Cikia Worked with us until 2 p.m. Then walked around with dibia visiting people. 
Ekodu - 8 to 2, to Oboko where her ogo died 3 days ago. This ogo was her dead hsbd's dau 
(by another wife) hsbd's mother. Brought nothing with her, 
just went to sympathise. Then rested. 
Eleke - 8 to 2, cracked palm. Then rested. 
Kalu - Worked for you all day. 
Ofruice - Held Ekodu's child. 
 
Mba Worked on okoro house until 2. Then came to court to listen to case of a friend unti 5 
p.m. 
Ahudiya - Home all day. 6 or 8 months pregnant, so she feels ill. 
Amabua - 7 to 11, to dibia for divining because Uce's fowl has been stolen and she wanted to 
find out who stole the fowl. Later I saw her with things for sacrifice (I don't know which 
agbara) so that the thief can be killed. For a case like this she paid 3d. 
 
Uda 7 to 9, directed us in building ikorso house. Then 8 to 3, he went someplace; I know not 
where. 
Ikoka - 7 to 11, to Ako Farm I to plant odudu. Then rested. 
Ejere - Still at Mgbele. 
Ekeru - Home - child. 
Ugwuade - Not seen all day. 
Akaji - 7 to 2, lto wee her share of Ako Farm I. Went alone. Then rested. 
 
Egwuonwu Home all day, resting. 
Mmeziri - 8 to 12, to Farm I to get leaves for ofo. Then cooked. 
Iheukwumere - 7 to 8, put mats on roof of his house, then came to work with us. Then rested. 
 
  
APPENDIX C: MISSING DATA 
 
In Table A1, we estimate (1) using a dummy variable for whether no activities are reported 
for individual i as the dependent variable. The first panel tests whether men are more likely to 
be missing from the record depending on the activities of their wives. Though there are 
significant correlations for hunting and home repair, these are driven by the small numbers of 
observations for which women engage in these activities. The correlation with whether a wife 
is missing is large, albeit insignificant. The second panel performs the same exercise for 
women. They are less likely to be in the data when their husbands are missing.  
 
Whether children are missing does depend on a parent’s activity. Children are less likely to 
be reported when a parent is engaged in going to market, and are less likely to be missing 
when a parent is sick. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Right-hand side variable: Missing
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Spousal activity 0.214 -0.030 0.018 -0.044 0.069 -0.045 -0.014 0.155 0.031 -0.008 0.002 0.046 0.032
   Men (N=1,640) (0.109) (0.027) (0.017) (0.034) (0.049) (0.033) (0.030) (0.024)*** (0.022) (0.009) (0.031) (0.050) (0.058)
Spousal activity 0.207 0.006 -0.008 -0.027 -0.022 -0.010 0.006 0.062 -0.025 0.011 0.001 0.006 -0.070
   Women (N=1,968) (0.077)** (0.000) (0.006) (0.026) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.019)** (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000)
Parental activity 0.076 -0.003 -0.011 -0.025 -0.037 -0.021 -0.010 -0.137 -0.010 0.045 -0.034 0.024 0.076
   Children (N=1,640) (0.113) (0.021) (0.019) (0.000) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.045)** (0.029) (0.016)* (0.044) (0.000) (0.026)**
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered by person
are reported in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: Missing
Table A1: Correlates of missing data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting
Making 
mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Sick -0.001 -0.185 0.001 -0.042 -0.018 -0.086 -0.012 -0.042 -0.010 0.007 0.313 1.000
   Men (N=1,893) (0.012) (0.032)*** (0.020) (0.024)* (0.011)* (0.022)*** (0.019) (0.013)*** (0.023) (0.033) (0.041)*** (0.000)***
Sick -0.074 -0.376 -0.028 -0.191 -0.073 -0.130 -0.001 0.005 -0.102 -0.053 0.679 1.000
   Women (N=3,134) (0.055) (0.024)*** (0.009)*** (0.044)*** (0.018)*** (0.029)*** (0.002) (0.004) (0.025)*** (0.016)*** (0.026)*** (0.000)***
Spouse : Sick 0.015 0.061 -0.018 0.067 0.004 -0.018 0.011 -0.018 0.022 -0.046 -0.010 0.012
   Men (N=1,388) (0.017) (0.029)** (0.024) (0.029)** (0.029) (0.025) (0.020) (0.010)* (0.020) (0.035) (0.024) (0.010)
Spouse : Sick -0.042 -0.234 -0.015 -0.041 -0.120 -0.002 0.000 0.073 -0.061 -0.031 -0.033 0.118
   Women (N=1,786) (0.105) (0.149) (0.006)** (0.113) (0.066)* (0.026) (0.000) (0.038)* (0.069) (0.016)** (0.062) (0.037)***
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick -0.004 -0.038 0.004 -0.076 0.025 -0.008 0.018 -0.016 0.047 -0.027 -0.119 -0.184
   Men (N=1,893) (0.014) (0.055) (0.029) (0.026)*** (0.026) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.029) (0.029) (0.080) (0.197)
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.015 0.025 0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.024 0.001 0.003 0.012 -0.009 -0.099 -0.121
   Women (N=3,134) (0.028) (0.031) (0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.022) (0.001) (0.003) (0.020) (0.016) (0.051)* (0.070)*
Children : Sick -0.020 0.034 0.031 -0.021 0.014 -0.032 -0.007 -0.023 0.001 0.024 0.000 0.016
   Men (N=1,082) (0.056) (0.038) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.023) (0.021) (0.017) (0.040) (0.014)* (0.047) (0.006)***
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time
trends. Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Table A2: Responses to illness with CGM Standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Parents : Sick -0.106 -0.118 -0.055 -0.058 -0.041 0.027 0.092 -0.005 -0.161 0.065 0.114 0.051
   Children (N=953) (0.090) (0.121) (0.046) (0.054) (0.032) (0.059) (0.076) (0.023) (0.069)** (0.097) (0.151) (0.052)
Parents : Farmed 0.050 0.202 0.006 0.102 0.037 0.001 -0.021 0.016 -0.010 -0.012 -0.096 -0.033
   Children (N=953) (0.029)* (0.049)*** (0.030) (0.016)*** (0.014)*** (0.034) (0.016) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019) (0.044)** (0.015)**
Parents : Palm production -0.030 -0.031 -0.011 0.029 -0.069 0.080 -0.012 0.002 0.026 0.102 0.029 -0.022
   Children (N=953) (0.024) (0.073) (0.030) (0.090) (0.031)** (0.041)* (0.019) (0.007) (0.039) (0.027)*** (0.050) (0.021)
Parents : Same Activity -0.165 0.202 0.375 0.102 0.284 0.090 0.068 0.193 0.050 0.102 0.036 0.051
   Children (N=953) (0.095)* (0.049)*** (0.163)** (0.047)** (0.031)*** (0.024)*** (0.027)** (0.054)*** (0.053) (0.027)*** (0.028) (0.052)
Parents : Resting -0.015 -0.044 -0.007 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.004 -0.014 -0.008 0.019 0.031
   Children (N=931) (0.094) (0.210) (0.084) (0.084) (0.067) (0.242) (0.017) (0.032) (0.046) (0.048) (0.266) (0.055)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard
errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Table A3: Child labor with CGM Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting
Making 
mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Spouse : Away 0.075 -0.013 -0.016 0.014 -0.040 0.049 -0.031 0.031 -0.007 -0.002 -0.078 0.008
   Men (N=1,388) (0.023)*** (0.062) (0.019) (0.058) (0.014)*** (0.034) (0.056) (0.018)* (0.040) (0.025) (0.071) (0.021)
Spouse : Away 0.115 -0.102 -0.006 -0.098 0.014 -0.057 0.000 -0.004 0.130 -0.050 0.192 -0.042
   Women (N=1,786) (0.104) (0.064) (0.006) (0.069) (0.077) (0.040) (0.000) (0.002)* (0.099) (0.124) (0.161) (0.098)
Spouse: Same Activity -0.084 0.081 0.321 0.074 0.246 0.069 0.098 0.570 0.024 0.329 -0.006 0.012
   Men (N=1,388) (0.042)** (0.053) (0.113)*** (0.034)** (0.042)*** (0.036)* (0.038)** (0.080)*** (0.056) (0.108)*** (0.021) (0.010)
Spouse: Same Activity -0.085 0.051 0.160 0.055 0.312 0.061 0.000 0.031 -0.047 0.524 -0.007 0.118
   Women (N=1,786) (0.075) (0.049) (0.074)** (0.042) (0.099)*** (0.033)* (0.000) (0.023) (0.054) (0.038)*** (0.033) (0.037)***
Table A4: Coordination between spouses with CGM Standard Errors
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends.
Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting
Making 
mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting
Spouse : Sick 0.015 0.064 -0.017 0.068 0.004 -0.017 0.012 -0.018 0.023 -0.048 -0.014
   Men (N=1,388) (0.016) (0.026)* (0.024) (0.028)* (0.028) (0.025) (0.021) (0.010) (0.020) (0.035) (0.022)
Spouse : Sick -0.031 -0.192 -0.012 -0.018 -0.110 0.015 0.073 -0.050 -0.022 -0.115
   Women (N=1,786) (0.110) (0.154) (0.006) (0.117) (0.060) (0.020) (0.037) (0.066) (0.018) (0.054)*
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick -0.005 -0.074 0.005 -0.086 0.023 -0.025 0.016 -0.024 0.046 -0.027 -0.063
   Men (N=1,893) (0.016) (0.030)** (0.028) (0.025)** (0.027) (0.010)* (0.020) (0.018) (0.030) (0.029) (0.040)
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.006 -0.021 0.001 -0.020 -0.012 0.008 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.016 -0.018
   Women (N=3,134) (0.023) (0.029) (0.006) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) (0.001) (0.004) (0.019) (0.014) (0.025)
Children : Sick -0.020 0.038 0.031 -0.020 0.014 -0.031 -0.007 -0.022 0.001 0.023 -0.005
   Men (N=1,082) (0.055) (0.036) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.039) (0.013) (0.046)
Table A5: Responses to illness Controlling for Own Illness
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time
trends. Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting
Parents : Sick -0.102 -0.111 -0.055 -0.053 -0.039 0.031 0.092 -0.002 -0.157 0.070 0.089
   Children (N=953) (0.085) (0.121) (0.044) (0.057) (0.033) (0.058) (0.073) (0.022) (0.066)* (0.096) (0.136)
Parents : Farmed 0.048 0.198 0.006 0.099 0.036 -0.001 -0.021 0.015 -0.013 -0.015 -0.080
   Children (N=953) (0.026) (0.045)** (0.029) (0.015)*** (0.012)** (0.035) (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.036)*
Parents : Palm production -0.031 -0.034 -0.011 0.027 -0.070 0.079 -0.012 0.001 0.024 0.100 0.039
   Children (N=953) (0.025) (0.070) (0.029) (0.088) (0.030)* (0.041) (0.018) (0.007) (0.038) (0.024)** (0.057)
Parents : Same Activity -0.166 0.198 0.376 0.101 0.283 0.090 0.068 0.191 0.050 0.100 0.016
   Children (N=953) (0.093) (0.045)** (0.157)* (0.046)* (0.028)*** (0.023)** (0.026)* (0.051)** (0.050) (0.024)** (0.026)
Parents : Resting -0.012 -0.039 -0.007 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.006 -0.011 -0.005 0.003
   Children (N=931) (0.016) (0.042) (0.017) (0.035) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) (0.027)
Table A6: Child labor Controlling for Own Illness
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends.
Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting
Making 
mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Sick 0.002 -0.083 0.017 -0.019 -0.007 -0.068 0.022 -0.030 -0.015 -0.003 0.160 1.000
   Men (N=1,893) (0.009) (0.048) (0.031) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019)** (0.021) (0.011)** (0.015) (0.015) (0.042)*** (0.000)***
Sick -0.049 -0.115 -0.005 -0.061 -0.018 -0.026 -0.001 0.005 -0.013 -0.018 0.208 1.000
   Women (N=3,134) (0.033) (0.027)*** (0.005) (0.026)** (0.012) (0.025) (0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.016) (0.036)*** (0.000)***
Spouse : Sick -0.017 0.038 -0.011 0.056 0.018 -0.010 0.014 0.025 0.040 -0.013 0.072 0.021
   Men (N=1,415) (0.007)* (0.025) (0.018) (0.011)*** (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)* (0.013) (0.027)* (0.031)
Spouse : Sick 0.026 -0.077 -0.000 -0.019 -0.020 0.019 0.030 0.027 -0.043 -0.037 0.060
   Women (N=1,826) (0.043) (0.075) (0.021) (0.051) (0.092) (0.047) (0.018) (0.033) (0.024) (0.119) (0.118)
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick 0.005 -0.067 -0.022 0.003 -0.009 0.010 0.035 -0.005 0.017 0.004 0.068 -0.007
   Men (N=1,893) (0.006) (0.072) (0.036) (0.033) (0.052) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.059) (0.166)
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.008 -0.000 -0.005 0.021 -0.000 0.021 -0.000 0.005 0.006 0.005 -0.044 0.026
   Women (N=3,134) (0.023) (0.021) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.000) (0.005) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020)* (0.080)
Children : Sick -0.034 -0.055 -0.008 -0.014 0.004 0.066 0.004 0.044 0.032 0.006 0.025 0.076
   Men (N=1,190) (0.032) (0.055) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024)* (0.019) (0.019) (0.012)* (0.008) (0.045) (0.097)
Table A7: Responses to illness. RHS variables measured over past week.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard
errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Parents : Sick -0.001 -0.061 0.014 -0.051 -0.014 -0.059 0.040 -0.004 -0.021 -0.044 0.008 0.001
   Children (N=959) (0.030) (0.084) (0.009) (0.077) (0.008) (0.042) (0.024) (0.004) (0.048) (0.048) (0.064) (0.024)
Parents : Farmed -0.030 0.235 0.019 0.115 0.035 -0.039 -0.042 0.010 0.152 0.007 -0.084 -0.075
   Children (N=959) (0.051) (0.060)** (0.015) (0.024)*** (0.017) (0.045) (0.022) (0.011) (0.053)** (0.022) (0.043) (0.031)*
Parents : Palm production -0.031 0.104 -0.009 0.028 0.035 0.030 0.013 -0.011 0.079 0.019 -0.040 -0.014
   Children (N=959) (0.015) (0.014)*** (0.010) (0.015) (0.013)* (0.012)* (0.007) (0.010) (0.040) (0.018) (0.054) (0.023)
Parents : Same Activity -0.002 0.235 0.071 0.027 0.074 0.027 0.034 0.072 -0.070 0.019 0.011 0.001
   Children (N=959) (0.028) (0.060)** (0.039) (0.013)* (0.023)** (0.022) (0.016) (0.031)* (0.030)* (0.018) (0.042) (0.024)
Parents : Resting 0.075 0.019 0.045 0.000 -0.023 -0.055 0.017 0.015 -0.006 -0.053 -0.003 0.066
   Children (N=860) (0.045) (0.089) (0.016)** (0.074) (0.025) (0.042) (0.021) (0.030) (0.022) (0.037) (0.042) (0.038)
Table A8: Child labor. RHS variables measured over past week.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard
errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Cared for 
child Farmed
Farm work - 
clearing
Farm work - 
harvesting
Farm work - 
planting Gathering Hunting Making mats
Went to 
market
Palm 
production Resting Sick
Parents : Sick 0.001 -0.232 -0.072 -0.137 -0.081 0.046 0.167 -0.023 -0.196 0.043 -0.036 -0.035
   Children (N=664) (0.002) (0.141) (0.079) (0.028)** (0.048) (0.070) (0.098) (0.054) (0.069)* (0.165) (0.109) (0.052)
Parents : Farmed 0.006 0.143 0.010 0.073 0.020 0.048 -0.038 0.030 -0.014 -0.003 -0.056 -0.012
   Children (N=664) (0.008) (0.018)*** (0.043) (0.039) (0.023) (0.051) (0.024) (0.017) (0.044) (0.030) (0.050) (0.003)**
Parents : Palm production -0.002 -0.096 -0.039 0.019 -0.102 0.118 -0.000 0.003 0.036 0.080 -0.026 0.015
   Children (N=664) (0.002) (0.108) (0.045) (0.122) (0.043)* (0.048)* (0.021) (0.021) (0.050) (0.036) (0.055) (0.007)
Parents : Same Activity 0.013 0.143 0.491 0.045 0.253 0.082 0.012 0.196 0.025 0.080 0.009 -0.035
   Children (N=664) (0.012) (0.018)*** (0.144)** (0.080) (0.043)** (0.044) (0.064) (0.101) (0.076) (0.036) (0.057) (0.052)
Parents : Resting 0.003 -0.021 -0.018 0.035 0.003 0.031 -0.002 0.014 -0.015 -0.003 0.008 0.028
   Children (N=651) (0.005) (0.049) (0.031) (0.032) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) (0.009) (0.029) (0.054) (0.011)*
Table A9: Child labor. Older Children.
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard
errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
Full 
Sample Men Women Children Farm Nonfarm Leisure
Sick 0.054 0.042 0.066 0.042 Parents : Sick -0.040 -0.203 -0.023
Any Farm Work 0.345 0.319 0.375 0.311    Children (N=953) (0.092) (0.098) (0.071)
Any NonFarm Work 0.455 0.379 0.517 0.414
Any Leisure 0.071 0.096 0.054 0.076 Parents : Farmed 0.179 0.049 -0.014
   Children (N=953) (0.038)*** (0.049) (0.023)
N 6,266 1,893 3,134 1,239
Parents : Palm production 0.089 0.075 -0.003
   Children (N=953) (0.044) (0.103) (0.018)
(1) (2) (3)
Farm Nonfarm Leisure Parents : Same Activity 0.183 0.105 0.047
   Children (N=953) (0.053)** (0.034)** (0.021)*
Sick -0.196 -0.135 -0.005
   Men (N=1,893) (0.046)*** (0.038)** (0.015) Parents : Resting -0.046 -0.037 0.006
   Children (N=931) (0.053) (0.028) (0.009)
Sick -0.421 -0.371 -0.022
   Women (N=3,134) (0.025)*** (0.068)*** (0.010)* (1) (2) (3)
Farm Nonfarm Leisure
Spouse : Sick 0.013 -0.007 0.067 Spouse : Away -0.014 0.044 0.089
   Men (N=1,388) (0.026) (0.038) (0.025)*    Men (N=1,388) (0.069) (0.054) (0.021)**
Spouse : Sick -0.244 -0.151 -0.012 Spouse : Away -0.154 0.207 -0.111
   Women (N=1,786) (0.145) (0.116) (0.012)    Women (N=1,786) (0.171) (0.069)** (0.056)
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick -0.069 0.075 -0.035 Spouse: Same Activity 0.095 0.005 0.059
   Men (N=1,893) (0.072) (0.037)* (0.023)    Men (N=1,388) (0.059) (0.031) (0.020)**
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.013 0.049 0.003 Spouse: Same Activity 0.063 -0.011 0.021
   Women (N=3,134) (0.031) (0.053) (0.016)    Women (N=1,786) (0.053) (0.031) (0.017)
Children : Sick 0.066 -0.007 -0.013
   Men (N=1,082) (0.047) (0.054) (0.026)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects,
and person-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Table A10: Aggregated categories
Panel B. Responses to illness
Panel D. Coordination
Panel C. Child Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2)
Full 
Sample Men Women Children Essential Non-Ess.
Sick 0.054 0.042 0.066 0.042 Parents : Sick -0.048 0.000
Any Essential Activity 0.608 0.541 0.672 0.550    Children (N=953) (0.127) (0.133)
Any NonEssential Activity 0.615 0.745 0.539 0.609
Parents : Farmed 0.205 -0.125
   Children (N=953) (0.048)** (0.065)
N 6,266 1,893 3,134 1,239
Parents : Palm production 0.098 -0.013
   Children (N=953) (0.083) (0.032)
(1) (2)
Essential Non-Ess. Parents : Same Activity 0.080 0.057
   Children (N=953) (0.027)** (0.044)
Sick -0.257 0.209
   Men (N=1,893) (0.047)*** (0.045)*** Parents : Resting -0.052 0.016
   Children (N=931) (0.055) (0.043)
Sick -0.579 0.476
   Women (N=3,134) (0.054)*** (0.036)*** (1) (2)
Essential Non-Ess.
Spouse : Sick 0.064 -0.031
   Men (N=1,388) (0.046) (0.038) Spouse : Away 0.068 0.014
   Men (N=1,388) (0.051) (0.044)
Spouse : Sick -0.397 0.157
   Women (N=1,786) (0.105)** (0.116) Spouse : Away -0.013 -0.070
   Women (N=1,786) (0.209) (0.162)
HH: Other Adult Male X Sick -0.070 0.032
   Men (N=1,893) (0.084) (0.066) Spouse: Same Activity 0.084 0.079
   Men (N=1,388) (0.056) (0.020)**
HH: Other Adult Female X Sick 0.058 -0.055
   Women (N=3,134) (0.040) (0.032) Spouse: Same Activity 0.027 0.044
   Women (N=1,786) (0.051) (0.041)
Children : Sick 0.027 0.049
   Men (N=1,082) (0.045) (0.043)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day
fixed effects, and person-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Table A11: Aggregated categories (essential v. not)
Panel A: Summary Statistics Panel C. Child Labor
Panel B. Responses to illness
Panel D. Coordination
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Housework Personal care Child care Leisure Market work
Farming and 
hunting
Sick and 
away
Community 
obligations
Sick -0.089 0.288 -0.001 0.290 -0.001 -0.199 0.943 -0.160
   Men (N=1,893) (0.015)*** (0.069)*** (0.011) (0.042)*** (0.047) (0.043)*** (0.041)*** (0.042)***
Sick -0.223 -0.008 -0.074 0.657 -0.152 -0.377 0.913 -0.032
   Women (N=3,134) (0.041)*** (0.003)** (0.054) (0.028)*** (0.036)*** (0.025)*** (0.046)*** (0.013)**
Spouse : Sick -0.027 0.036 0.015 0.012 -0.015 0.066 -0.015 0.082
   Men (N=1,388) (0.008)** (0.039) (0.016) (0.028) (0.037) (0.035) (0.025) (0.036)*
Spouse : Sick -0.063 0.066 -0.042 -0.042 -0.082 -0.234 0.179 0.069
   Women (N=1,786) (0.075) (0.018)** (0.104) (0.064) (0.074) (0.147) (0.062)** (0.100)
Parents : Sick -0.041 -0.040 -0.106 0.089 -0.096 -0.026 0.051 0.011
   Children (N=953) (0.067) (0.037) (0.087) (0.174) (0.070) (0.132) (0.065) (0.006)
Parents : Farmed 0.013 -0.006 0.050 -0.108 -0.011 0.181 -0.050 -0.008
   Children (N=953) (0.034) (0.004) (0.028) (0.056) (0.030) (0.051)** (0.038) (0.023)
Parents : Palm production 0.130 -0.017 -0.030 0.025 0.124 -0.043 -0.114 -0.010
   Children (N=953) (0.060)* (0.011) (0.023) (0.056) (0.028)** (0.080) (0.050)* (0.012)
Parents : Same Activity 0.099 0.060 -0.165 0.070 0.082 0.144 0.065 0.055
   Children (N=953) (0.011)*** (0.035) (0.092) (0.042) (0.029)** (0.036)** (0.065) (0.016)**
Parents : Resting 0.009 0.007 -0.015 0.025 -0.014 -0.038 0.084 -0.003
   Children (N=931) (0.025) (0.010) (0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.033) (0.022)** (0.008)
Spouse : Away 0.026 0.017 0.075 -0.024 -0.005 -0.041 0.057 0.008
   Men (N=1,388) (0.018) (0.033) (0.023)** (0.075) (0.036) (0.048) (0.072) (0.022)
Spouse : Away 0.015 0.001 0.115 0.116 0.087 -0.102 -0.030 -0.029
   Women (N=1,786) (0.133) (0.002) (0.103) (0.138) (0.093) (0.063) (0.091) (0.022)
Spouse: Same Activity 0.023 0.075 -0.084 -0.004 0.164 0.080 0.012 0.032
   Men (N=1,388) (0.018) (0.063) (0.041) (0.014) (0.065)* (0.039) (0.045) (0.027)
Spouse: Same Activity 0.015 0.021 -0.085 0.001 0.118 0.052 0.064 0.006
   Women (N=1,786) (0.017) (0.012) (0.074) (0.024) (0.049)* (0.038) (0.067) (0.022)
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS and include person fixed effects, day fixed effects, and
person-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered by person are reported in parentheses. 
Table A12: Broad categories
Panel B. Responses to illness
Panel C. Child Labor
Panel D. Coordination
